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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to determine whether urban water privatization has worked in the 
Global South. As water is required for domestic purposes, privatization is a 
contentious reform in most countries. Water privatization is investigated in six 
different prominent Global South cities to determine whether it has led to 
improvements over the previous publicly-provided water models. A comparative 
qualitative analysis of contracts, governance, contextual factors, and outcomes is 
conducted along with a partial quantitative analysis comparing water coverage, 
consumption and pricing before and after privatization. The results generally show 
that water privatization has mainly failed to improve water services beyond levels 
attained during previous public water services. There are a few exceptions though, 
highlighting both the complexities of delivering water service and a general lack of 
easily verifiable information to clearly compare the water models.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Water is an essential ingredient for human life. It is needed for a myriad of 
uses in improving and maintaining public, environmental and individual human 
health. Water is a necessary input for production of many goods in various economic 
sectors. It has been noted that the absolute minimum water required per person to 
satisfy basic needs is 50  litres per day (Gleick, 1996). Such assessments may be 
critical in establishing social policies pertaining to urban water availability. Increased 
industrialization, commercial agriculture and urbanization in the Global South put 
pressure on available potable water resources. However, historically established 
water networks and aging infrastructure are insufficient to meet modern urban 
domestic, commercial and industrial needs. Consequently, cities have searched for 
ways to improve urban water distribution services in recent decades.
An increasingly common solution has been private sector involvement, also 
commonly referred to as public-private partnerships or water privatization. Such 
contractual arrangements, in various forms, have acted to transfer operations, 
maintenance and improvements of water distribution and related services1 from 
governments to private sector parties. Water privatization has been introduced to 
varying degrees with differing intentions and promises of providing increased 
efficiency, financial capital, and water access. In all cases, water is treated as a 
commodity, in so far as there is a charge for access and specific consumption 
volumes to recover costs. Pricing water is deemed a necessary measure towards 
achieving state fiscal balance while giving incentive to private sector involvement.
1 Related services include billing collection, infrastructure works, and sewerage services. The latter 
includes sewer line connections, drainage networks, waste water treatment facilities, and other 
infrastructure (eg. Piping, lift stations, and materials).
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There is considerable debate though as to whether water privatization works and who 
has been served by such reforms.
1.1  Water Privatization Background
Since the international push for water privatization in the early 1990s, water 
privatization arrangements have varied across the world in terms of scope of 
services, level of control of the operator in planning and providing services, financing, 
contract terms and pricing mechanisms. During the 1970s and 1980s, the US and 
UK led various market-oriented deregulation and privatization reforms. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank aligned with and developed these 
policies in their respective structural adjustment policies across the Global South 
which have included the sale of public utilities, fiscal control measures, and 
deregulation reforms. The United Nations declared the 1980s  the 1st international 
decade for clean drinking water (1 9 8 1 -1 99 0 )2. As water needs have become 
increasingly overwhelming despite UN efforts, the World Bank began advocating for a 
comprehensive framework of water resource management that has included urban 
water privatization. The IMF has provided ongoing national level structural 
adjustment supports through loans, fiscal spending conditions, and related policy 
reforms. In 1989 , the US government and international financial institutions (IFI’s) 
developed the Washington Consensus which reiterated the market principles of the 
World Bank and IMF (See, for example, WHO, 201 3 ). This policy framework has 
acted to reinforce the principles, promotional efforts and actions to implement water 
privatization.
2 Declared in 1977 at United Nations 'Water Conference' at Mar del Plata.
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Since the 1990s, water privatization has been implemented in Global South 
nations on a widespread scale following structural adjustment programs of the World 
Bank, and IMF, also involving regional development banks. This policy framework 
has also generally included program management decentralization (as part of fiscal 
control measures) as part of the privatizations of utilities. The specific water 
concession model design has included loan and grant financing to governments 
leading up to privatization, followed by longterm capital financing to be provided by 
the private sector participants. Water pricing under the model is established to 
ensure full cost recovery.
1.2 Water Privatization Debate
The ongoing water privatization debate has been increasingly contentious and 
polarized. The arguments for water privatization are that the private sector can more 
effectively and efficiently deliver the technical, operational, and infrastructure 
expansion requirements for water supply services. Elements of these assertions 
include that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector and has greater 
access to financial capital. These factors all amount to the argument that the private 
sector has superior capacity to provide services. The private sector’s access to 
capital is dependent on the potential profitability of investments.
The efficiency argument for private sector provision is argued as a contrast to 
pre-existing public inefficiencies. These include, for example, poor management, 
inefficient investment, fiscal imbalances, and that the provider and regulator should 
not be the same entity. Efficiency and addressing state fiscal burdens are noted as 
two of the most important reasons for private sector involvement in public utilities 
(Graham, 1998). Shirley and Menard (2002 ) note that, “Efficient operation keeps
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costs down, thereby reducing dependence on government subsidies and freeing 
resources for investment in expansion and maintenance” (p. 3). Privatization 
proponents would also argue that the private sector can better respond to specific 
operational requirements such as increasing labour productivity, reducing water 
system losses (generally referred to as non-revenue water or unaccounted-for-water), 
and improving bill collection services3. These efficiencies are also cited as potentially 
helping to alleviate poverty, an objective of water privatization that has been cited by 
the World Bank. Such notions of efficiency imply that water service improvements 
can positively impact social welfare in various ways. For example, less tim e collecting 
water can free time that could be used for gainful employment. Improved quality of 
water improves health which also can improve productivity. Both of these effects can 
potentially reduce poverty.
The World Bank acknowledges that there are consumers unwilling (or unable) 
to pay for water, and indicate that: “To manage water resources more effectively, a 
balanced set of policies and institutional reforms should be sought that will both 
harness the efficiency of market forces and strengthen the capacity of governments 
to carry out their essential roles” (The World Bank, 1993 , p. 10).
Arguments for public provision of water revolve around the notion that elected 
governments are answerable to the people (i.e. water customers), and that water is 
necessary for human health and well-being and that its access can only be assured 
by the state's direct involvement in funding and operating water services. These 
arguments centre on the notion that a price should not necessarily be charged for 
water, or that it should be provided without charge to households that cannot afford
3 Bill collection is not specifically assessed in this thesis.
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it. A core part of the argument for public provision of water suggests that access to 
water is a human right and that the social or cultural value placed on water cannot 
necessarily or easily be monetized.
In the cases examined in this study, domestic households were paying for 
potable4 water from the existing networks prior to water privatization. Pricing reform 
is just one potential element of water privatization. Realistically, privatization 
requires various regulatory mechanisms to adjust to a third party water provider.
Public water model arguments might suggest that privatization arguments fail 
to acknowledge the nature and extent of the essential roles of government and the 
potential broader social consequences of privatization. These arguments may not 
necessarily differ from the privatization argument -  admitting that many Global South 
nations have had a poor track record in providing adequate water services to urban 
populations. The complexities of the public vs. private water debate become 
apparent when applied to urban water service in the Global South. Issues of 
allocative efficiency and equitable distribution are not easily addressed strictly within 
the confines of the public vs. private water debate. As a result, it is simply imperative 
to assess the merits of the application of the water model and its respective 
outcomes.
1.3 Research Objective
The objective of this thesis is to examine the question of whether urban water 
privatization has worked in the Global South. This objective can be pursued by 
assessing and comparing cases where water privatization has been implemented.
4 Although network water is intended to be potable, levels of contamination vary, partly relating to 
water pressure.
5
The nature and extent of privatization’s performance is examined by identifying the 
underlying factors that have contributed to water privatization’s successes and /or 
failures. Important criteria include whether water privatization has: (1) provided 
water access to new consumers, while (2) continuing and improving upon service to 
existing customers. As more information is generally available on the privatization 
era of water services, contractual and performance target compliance act as proxies 
to assess water privatization. The overall goal of the study is to identify and articulate 
meaningful policy lessons and recommendations for the future of water distribution 
policy frameworks in the Global South. At the same time, the rising trend of water 
privatization in the Global South in recent decades holds important lessons for future 
water privatization and water services models in general implemented in regions with 
comparable levels of urban sprawl and poverty.
1.4 Comparative Case Study Rationale
In order to understand the underlying reasons for water privatization 
outcomes, it is important to examine the evidence across multiple cases as relating 
to various influential factors such as contractual arrangements, governance, 
economic and political contexts, and the direct outcomes stemming from these 
factors. A broad set of criteria is essential to this analysis. These varied factors 
reflect the value of a mixed method approach that includes qualitative and 
quantitative elements.
This thesis examines water privatization in six major urban cities around the 
world: Buenos Aires (Argentina), Jakarta (Indonesia), Manila (Philippines), Casablanca 
(Morocco), La Paz-EI Alto (Bolivia), and Guayaquil (Ecuador). All six of these cases are 
water concession agreements, which comprise water distribution system operation,
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maintenance and capital investment requirements over an extended 2 5  to 3 0  year 
lease period. These cases were chosen as they meet specific criteria. First of all, 
they are all water concessions, which are the most comprehensive water privatization 
arrangements.5 Contractually, concession agreements by definition all include water 
operations and maintenance, and private investment requirements. This type of 
arrangement is considered to be the flagship model of water privatization that was 
being implemented in the 1990s throughout the world. Secondly, all six cases have 
been based on long range commitments and have been in place more than five years 
(and generally much longer). Thirdly, all of the cases represent large urban 
populations over one million inhabitants. The six chosen water privatization cases all 
meet these criteria.6
1.5 Thesis Contributions
The academic literature to date has covered a variety of topics and has mostly 
covered specific case findings. The purposes often differ from the intentions of this 
thesis. Many previous studies’ findings are not necessarily robust due to either 
limited geography (i.e. the number of cases assessed) or varying elements of analysis 
(in contrast to those suggested above and herein). There does not appear to be an 
individual study that attempts to broadly understand how water privatization has 
been implemented across several comparable cases objectively analyzing factors 
and trends that have contributed to the resulting outcomes. Therefore, this thesis 
undertakes to systematically examine water privatization in six major urban cities
5 Sewerage services, waste water management, and regional water resource management issues are 
only anecdotally assessed in this thesis.
6 For purposes of this thesis, water privatization is defined as the concession agreement model and its 
components relating to water provision.
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with the purpose of identifying the factors that have contributed to success and /or 
failure using both qualitative and quantitative analysis.
A comparative qualitative approach is used, sourcing information from 
academic literature and public sources describing and examining any of the six urban 
water privatization cases. The categorical information for this analysis includes the 
elements previously noted: (1) the nature of the contracts, (2) governance and 
regulation, (3) economic and political contextual factors, and (4) resulting outcomes. 
As mentioned earlier, far less information is available on the previous public water 
model for these cases; as a result, the above categories of analysis are the  
benchmarks used to assess water privatization. A quantitative approach was initially 
intended, to involve a full analysis of water coverage as well as consumption7 trends 
under public and private water models. However, significant data limitations for the 
various cities have severely limited the degree to which a proper quantitative analysis 
could be carried out. As a result, only a partial quantitative analysis has been 
attempted in this thesis. The partial quantitative analysis is based on sporadic 
information from varying sources, permitting a cursory analysis of water coverage, 
consumption and pricing, as applicable, to supplement the qualitative analysis. 
Consequently, the thesis gives more weight to the qualitative analysis. As the general 
goal of privatization has been broadly cited as to outperform the prior public model, 
the metrics of this performance should be comprised in the contractual agreements 
and respective targets.
The key findings of this thesis are that water privatization has not generally 
worked. The examined cases show that water privatization, as implemented, has not
7 Analysis of consumption also includes pricing comparison.
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effectively improved levels of water service beyond those encountered during 
preceding public provision models. Water privatization has brought with it various 
complications to the governance of water services, which have contributed to a lack 
of water network expansion. Some of the key reasons for such lack of service relate 
to the contractual design and resulting arrangements, governance and regulatory 
weaknesses that permit a lack of service accountability and capital outflows (or 
flight). The competing interests reflected by an internationally predetermined water 
model, and government policies that maintain national oversight over local 
administration of urban water models are also identified as contributing to 
privatization failures. The potential exception to some of these findings relates to 
Casablanca which has made specific contract remedies to address performance 
shortcomings during the first ten years of privatization. Furthermore, part of the 
Manila case, the East Manila concession, appears to operate more successfully than 
other concessions based on reported water coverage performance, although this is 
found to include use of pre-existing informal water supply methods.
Again, these findings are subject to various information limitations which are 
highlighted through the analysis and in the conclusions drawn in this thesis.
9
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, literature assessing water privatization is reviewed, with 
particular focus on the six cases examined in this study. Although some of the 
research conducted has aligned with the objectives of this thesis, particularly for 
Buenos Aires, Jakarta and Manila cases, far fewer research articles and sources are 
identified for the other three cases, Casablanca, La Paz/EI Alto, and Guayaquil. Even 
fewer studies found on the latter cases have focused on the specific objective of 
whether water privatization has worked. For guidance, this chapter is broadly 
organized into three categories that include some topical and perspective overlaps. 
The first category covers research that finds privatization has worked or can work if 
specific conditions are met. The second category includes literature that finds water 
privatization has failed or focuses on identifying its failures and lessons learned. The 
third category examines issues relating to governance and regulation.
2 .1  Water Privatization Can Work 
Buenos Aires:
Alcazar et al. (2000) examine the Buenos Aires water concession during its 
early years (1993  onwards) finding that the concession expanded services and also 
resulted in lower tariffs8 (26.9% reduction in bid). Consequently, the authors have 
concluded that Buenos Aires was better off with water privatization. They conduct a 
welfare analysis finding that consumers benefited most, although upper and middle- 
income users benefited disproportionately. They also suggest that contract revisions 
and renegotiations did not substantially impact consumer welfare (Alcazar et al.,
8 Water tariff is the common description of the price of potable water, as it is deemed a charge for 
access to the resource, although in most cases, the water tariff generally refers to a variable price per 
cubic metre of water.
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2000). Various areas of improvement are identified such as, information 
asymmetries, perverse incentives, weak regulatory institutions, politicizing of the 
regulator, contract flaws, an obscure tariff system and lack of transparency in the 
regulation process (Alcazar et al., 2000 , p.2). The authors conclude that privatization 
resulted in better performance, operational efficiencies, and increased investment, 
but that the areas requiring improvement led to a lack of public confidence (Alcazar 
et al., 2000 , p.1-2).
Alcazar et a I. (2000) have conducted a relevant analysis for review, although 
the data and methodology used to arrive at their findings are not clear. Also, the 
authors have made broad generalizations that do not appear substantiated. For 
example, they indicate that those that gained piped water and sewerage services in 
Buenos Aires, “...will no longer be consuming contaminated well water or polluting 
groundwater or rivers” (Alcazar et al., p.53). Such statements are questionable 
considering the short period of observation, which raises questions as to the  
legitimacy of these findings.
Post (2009) suggests that Buenos Aires water contract provisions designed to 
increase company revenues, with additional policies to enhance company reputation 
being added later can have socially beneficial effects. Post concludes that the 
contract was weakened and time horizon shortened by moves relating to either short 
term political survival or firms losing confidence in the region, which in turn reduced 
social benefits. The author identifies the lesson of needing to understand the 
institutional environment before entering the concession, continuing that the  
apparent lack of such understanding weakened the Buenos Aires concession. Post 
suggests that the private sector’s lack of service to the poor related to the profit
11
motive deterring the firm from capital investment in poor areas. The author also 
identifies the need for information improvements, and that the company needed to 
address issues previously perpetuated by the state. Consequently, Post implies that 
water privatization can theoretically have positive social benefits although the 
Buenos Aires case has failed in some respects.9
As with Alcazar et al., Post’s analysis, appears to focus on the tenets of 
privatization, with some illustration of failures that, if avoided, may have helped the 
concession succeed. Both Alcazar et al. and Post focus on criticisms of the Buenos 
Aires privatization model as implemented, but with underlying tones being apparent, 
that support this specific type of service delivery model. Also, both articles give little 
weight to public opinion, and their respective analyses ignore international factors. 
Furthermore, public opinion is viewed only from the perspective of its value in 
garnering acceptance of water privatization policy and the company,
Manila:
Wu and Malaluan (2008) compare the two water concessions in Manila 
(Manila Water serving East Manila, and Maynilad serving West Manila), exploring the 
differences in internal factors that have affected concessionaire10 success. The 
authors find that, of the two concessionaires, Manila Water, the company serving 
East Manila has been successful. This success is found to be a result of a 
combination of factors including corporate governance, financial management and 
operations management. The authors cite the importance of employing a 
sustainable method of awarding technical consultant contracts, and find that
9 Note that the Buenos Aires concession was terminated in 2006.
10 Concessionaire is used synonymously with consortium and company to describe the private entities 
contracted to provide the water services under a concession agreement.
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Maynilad (West Manila) failed in this respect. The authors identify differences in 
financial management practices, operational efficiencies, service improvements and 
capital expenditure decisions between the companies as reasons for Manila W ater’s 
success.
Wu and Malaluan focus their analysis on internal company factors in affecting 
water privatization outcomes.
Chia et al. (2007) also examine Manila’s water privatization, concluding that it 
can work if various challenges are navigated; with government, private sector and the 
public all playing key roles to make it successful. They find that the concession 
process was transparent. The authors also find that there were early improvements 
in water coverage, availability and quality, but had problems with non-revenue water 
targets11. The West Manila (Maynilad) contract failure led to early notice of 
termination in 2002 , and is noted as being the result of an inability to obtain 
financing, currency devaluation, and ineffective planning and management practices. 
Specifically, it is suggested that Maynilad did not engage in due diligence with 
respect to the condition of water infrastructure prior to the concession. The authors 
acknowledge the lack of capacity of the regulator, whose employees also complained 
of irregular practices during the concession process (Chia et al. 2007). The 
regulatory office, created as a result of the concession, did not provide for 
transparency or public involvement. The authors recommend the importance of: 
government capacity and regulatory structures, policy, research, public input,
11 Non-revenue water generally refers to the proportion of water volume produced that is not sold. The 
proportion that is sold is also referred to as water consumption.
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allocation of risk, transparency, financing, and (acknowledge) the challenge of the 
politics of water (Chia et al., 2007 , p.16-17).
Chia et al. (2007) provides a focused analysis on factors that led to the failure 
of the West Manila concession. This analysis is contrasted to the implied success of 
the East Manila water concession. The authors are not attempting to assess whether 
water privatization works though. Although various criteria for success are identified, 
the authors do not provide a critical examination of how these factors affected both 
concessions.
Casablanca:
Jamati (2003 ) examined the first five years of the Casablanca water 
privatization. The article concludes that the Casablanca utility privatization has been 
successful given a 20% increase in population served, water loss reductions (24  
million cubic metres per year), significant flood risk reduction, and customer service 
improvements (Jamati, 2003). It appears that the data used to report on these 
findings came from the Moroccan government or concessionaire12 although 
references are not provided for the article. This is the only article identified that finds 
Casablanca’s water privatization a success. Its primary shortcoming, in addition to 
no verified peer reviewed sources, is that performance targets are simply stated as 
having been achieved without any critical assessment.
La Paz-EI Alto:
Foster and Irusta (2003) examine electricity, telecommunications and water 
and sewerage privatization reforms in La Paz-EI Alto, Bolivia to determine the effects
12 The term Concessionaire refers to the partnered entity that holds the water concession agreement 
with the respective government. This term is used synonymously with consortium, partnership or 
company (although this may also refer to the majority shareholder which is generally the operator of 
the water services).
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on poor households. The authors find that the water and sewerage concession 
initially showed improvements in service access and improved accountability, with a 
20% water tariff increase. The report indicates that network water and sewerage 
coverage increased in the few years prior to reform, and was then to expand further 
under the concession specifically in El Alto, which is predominantly poor. The authors 
find that changes to the block tariff structure, removing a fixed charge but increasing 
per-use rates, should save water costs for households consuming less than seven 
cubic metres of water per month (Foster and Irusta, 2003). Foster and Irusta 
generally conclude that water and sewerage reforms led to positive impacts for poor 
households.13
Foster and Irusta have focused on assessing the contract targets relating to 
poorer neighbourhoods in La Paz-EI Alto. Their results are preliminary given that only 
a few years of observation were available. Also, the authors are not critically 
examining the La Paz-EI Alto water contract, its circumstances or questioning 
reported outcomes.
Hailu et al. (2009) also look at Bolivia’s water privatization experiences, 
examining water coverage, equity and affordability. The authors conclude that water 
access expanded proportionally for La Paz-EI Alto, and highlight that the poor in La 
Paz were spending 2.6% of their income on water, which is considered affordable 
(Hailu et al., 2009). The authors suggest that the private sector needs public support 
to meet network expansion obligations. This article is rather cursory and does not 
critically examine the La Paz-EI Alto water privatization.
13 Note that the contract terms for water network expansion in La Paz /  El Alto focused on 
predominantly poor un-serviced areas in El Alto neighbourhoods. This is discussed further in this 
chapter as well as in Chapter 3.
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Dardenne (2006) concludes that La Paz-EI Alto is a good example of a water 
distribution program servicing the poor (Dardenne, 2006 , p.9). The author finds that 
this concession was generally successful until its second five years of 
implementation when the rise in political unrest responding to poor economic 
conditions and a stoppage in network expansion deemed the concession not 
economically viable.14
Morales et al. (2006) author a report for CIESS-Econometrica (Centro de 
Estudios Economicos y Sociales), a Bolivian research institute, which concludes that 
the La Paz-EI Alto water privatization had no impact on consumption, and a possible 
positive impact on coverage within El Alto, and specifically for its poor (Morales et al., 
2006 , p.50-51). Specific lessons identified are discussed in the next section.
The literature in this section has included coverage of the Buenos Aires, 
Manila, Casablanca and La Paz-EI Alto cases. Although the studies do not all 
necessarily conclude that water privatization has or could succeed, it has generally 
focused on the private sector’s potential to succeed without critical examination of 
direct comparison to potential public sector or alternative modes of water provision. 
Although lessons or failures have been identified in a few cases, the focus has 
generally been on internal company factors. Also, the above literature’s preliminary 
shortcomings include a general lack of examining contractual performance failures, 
governance and regulatory factors, and political and economic factors that have 
affected water privatization outcomes. The few exceptions to these criticisms include 
additional coverage in the next section.
14 Specific failures relating to the La Paz-EI Alto privatization identified by Dardenne (20 06 ) are 
discussed in the next section.
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2.2 Water Privatization Has Failed 
Buenos Aires:
Solanes (2006) draws lessons from the Buenos Aires water privatization 
(1 9 9 3  -  2006). The author indicates that privatization was precipitated by a debt 
crisis that worsened during the privatization reforms. During water privatization, 
Argentina suffered currency devaluation, doubling of unemployment, and increased 
poverty and inequality. The author identifies privatization factors and failures: 
information asymmetries, inefficient, vague and non-transparent pricing, a weak 
regulatory system, high price impacts on low income households (represented 85%  of 
the unconnected) (Solanes, p.6). The regulatory system was deemed flawed based 
on contract regulation (rather than law) and a politically appointed regulator with 
insufficient tools that was circumvented at times (Solanes, p.11-12). Solanes’ article 
highlights that many of Buenos Aires’ privatization failures relate to the lacking 
regulatory model, methods of evaluating the contract, and factors not easily 
separated from the economic situation in Argentina. The author also finds that 
monopolistic private sector water management, and full cost recovery up to the  
medium term, are not feasible policies (Solanes, 2006).
Solanes’ report provides a critical analysis of the Buenos Aires case. The 
author does not cover international influence though. Furthermore, the assessment 
is not intended to assess whether privatization has worked.
Olleta (2007) assesses the World Bank’s role in urban water privatization with 
specific review of the Buenos Aires case. The author concludes that the Buenos 
Aires case was a failure since the private consortium, Aguas Argentinas, focused 
services on areas already covered by the water and sanitation network, and delayed
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investments in expansion (particularly with respect to sanitation infrastructure).
Olleta discusses the World Bank’s unchanging stance that has continued to support 
private sector participation in water. Olleta (2007 , citing Karina Forcinito at the Third 
World Forum, March 2003) points out that the World Bank managed to change the 
original contract over a nine year period to transfer risks to users, add new fixed 
charges and increase tariffs by 88.2% , where by 2 0 0 3  poorest families spent 9% of 
their income on water and sewerage.
Olleta provides valuable insight into the World Bank’s influence on the Buenos 
Aires water privatization, but does not assess other privatization factors.
Food and Water Watch (2009a), an NGO focused on the safety of food, water 
and fish, which advocates for public control, lists the following contextual failures 
relating to the Buenos Aires water privatization case: (1) internal political pressure 
and corruption that weakened the regulator’s authority, and removed it from  
subsequent contract negotiations, (2) the direct influence of the World Bank as an 
advocate and shareholder of the Aguas Argentinas (the company) including a 
manager being appointed to the company to facilitate the contract renegotiation in 
1997, (3) support and pressure for the French water company by the French 
Government (Food and Water Watch, 2009a). As the Argentinean financial crisis 
response resulted in denying the company’s requests for a new fixed $US-Peso 
exchange rate and 42% water price increase, the company threatened legal action 
through the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which 
eventually lead to the contract’s termination in 2 0 0 6  (Food and Water Watch,
2009a). Finally, Food and Water Watch report, citing the regulator Ente Tripartite de
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Obras y Servicios Sanitarios (ETOSS)15, finds that over the duration of the contract, 
the company only met 10% of its contractual obligations (Food and W ater Watch, 
2 0 0 9 a 16). Food and Water Watch’s report on the Buenos Aires provides some 
valuable contextual information, although the report is not a comprehensive critical 
assessment of the privatization.
Castro and Azpiazu (2012) find that the Buenos Aires private water operator 
failed to comply with contractual expansion and investment targets (as well as 
environmental protection and service quality); and that government authorities 
submitted to company interests. The authors add that the company’s strategy was to 
pursue "extraordinary profits” which worked for the company until 2 0 0 2  when the 
renegotiated contract model collapsed in the face of a national crisis. They also 
acknowledge that the impacts from the privatization are not yet fully understood, and 
such impacts will hinder the state’s ability to reach universal access to services in 
future (Castro and Azpiazu, 2012 , p.71). Castro and Azpiazu provide insight into the  
Buenos Aires water privatization although the primary focus of their article relates to 
institutional changes transitioning to remunicipalization of the water services.
The Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU) has produced a 
number of reports, which surround the international failure of water privatization, 
power of multinational companies, policies of the World Bank and implied impacts on 
affected populations reflected by widespread protests (PSIRU, 2005). One of these 
reports, by Lobina and Hall (2007), finds that the Buenos Aires concession was 
suffering poor performance even before currency devaluation. They highlight that
15 No citation provided.
16 Also see Public Citizen (2003).
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water prices were renegotiated and the company under invested (Only 61%  of 
projected levels achieved) during the first 10 years (Lobina and Hall, 2 0 0 7 , citing 
ETOSS via Ducci, 2007). This report provides some compelling evidence, and 
although previously published PSIRU reports are also cited, the contractual terms, 
governance and performance outcomes are only briefly highlighted without extensive 
examination in the individual reports accessed.
Dardenne (2006) finds that two million inhabitants, primarily living in slums, 
were left out of the water and sewerage concession area. Additionally, the author 
finds that only 25% of the two million poor which were within the concession area 
were receiving water services after 10  years (Dardenne, 2 0 0 6 , p.7). He indicates 
that it was an ambitious plan to connect the un-served 3 .5  million inhabitants within 
the concession area. This report provides valuable insight into the lack of 
performance on initial targets and the exclusion of peri-urban populations from the 
concession area.
Jakarta:
Argo and Laquian (2007) find that Kampong17 (remnants of original villages 
within the city) conditions in Jakarta worsened because the water privatization forced 
wells and other sources, including illegal connections, to close (Argo & Laquian, 
2007). The authors point out that vendors increased water fees in the face of 
scarcity experienced in the poor neighbourhoods. They conclude various reasons 
impacting the Jakarta water privatization: (1) the size and scale of the privatization 
schemes, (2) incentives based on water volumes, (3) the difficulty in extending into 
informal settlements contributed to the companies not extending services to the poor
17 Also spelled Kampung.
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in hazardous areas (that would have ended informal water arrangements that had 
been providing water and sanitation options to such areas)18, (4) political 
interference, influence, and corruption, (5) the high costs of foreign borrowing and 
consultants, and (6) concessionaire deals and bailouts contributed to the exorbitant 
costs of the privatization schemes (Argo and Laquian, 2 00 7 , p.245-246). The 
authors conclude that all of these factors affected the ability of the concessionaires 
to extend network services (Argo and Laquian, 2007).
Manila:
Argo and Laquian’s (2007) article also covers Manila and the conclusions 
cited above also apply to this case. The authors point out that vendors in Manila also 
increased water fees affecting poor neighbourhoods. Manila’s situation was already 
bad before privatization, then prices increased ten-fold for the rich while increasing 
four-fold under vendor schemes (Argo & Laquian, 2007). The authors indicate that 
water rates in Manila were increased in response to company troubles partly arising 
from the fallout of the Asian economic crisis, with Maynilad (West Manila contractor) 
increasing prices by four times and Manila Water (East Manila contractor) increasing 
prices six-fold. Although water rates increased, the volume of water available also 
increased, albeit unequally. Argo and Laquian find that the resulting rate increases 
mostly affected middle and upper classes and private businesses. The authors’ 
previously cited reasons affecting water privatization in Jakarta, also apply to Manila: 
(1) privatization size and scale, (2) water volume incentives, (3) informal settlement 
difficulties maintaining informal water arrangements, (4) Political interference,
18 The authors also note that services in Jakarta (as well as Manila) were extended to the edges of 
poor neighbourhoods with responsibility transferred to local leaders and vendors to extend network 
services.
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influence, and corruption, (5) High costs of foreign borrowing and consultants, and 
(6) The concessionaire deals and bailouts contributed to the exorbitant costs of the 
privatization schemes (Argo and Laquian, 2 00 7 , p .245-246). The authors conclude 
that all of these factors also affected the Manila concessionaires’ ability to extend 
network services (Argo and Laquian, 2007).
Argo and Laquian provide a detailed analysis of the Jakarta and Manila cases, 
although the nature of the contract model and terms, including regulatory terms and 
international influence, are not thoroughly examined.
A Public Citizen (2003) report covering the Maynilad Water privatization for 
West Manila finds that unanticipated high operating costs and price regulation led to 
disputes and the eventual changeover of company ownership. The report (2003 , 
citing Esguerra, 2001) also highlights contract renegotiations including foreign 
exchange loss transfers to consumers, so that corporate suppliers and consultants 
could continue being used.
The Public Citizen report on the West Manila water concession highlights 
some privatization failures. This report is very brief though and is focused on 
advocating for public water provision.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) evaluates its own role in M anila’s water 
privatization and recommends the need for: (1) an appropriate tariff policy, whereby 
tariffs increase only after service improvements, and (2) financial support during 
early stage operations (ADB, 2008 , p.37). The report identifies key lessons such as 
(the need for) holding concession designers accountable, flexible terms, independent 
and effective regulation, and political leadership (ADB, 2 00 8 , p.38). The report also
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points out that about 65% of connected households surveyed still use other water 
sources (ADB, 2 00 8 , p.51).
Casablanca:
Lahlou (2008), President of ACM E-Morocco, a water advocacy group, 
discusses the negative aspects of water privatization in Morocco. He explains 
Morocco’s background with structural adjustment policies in the 1980s  and 1990s, 
and the rigidity of policies that do not allow for an alternative to privatization. The 
article points to the magnitude of Moroccan water and electricity privatization in 
Casablanca, Rabat and Tangier-Tetouan: accounting for 2 -  2.5% of the country’s 
GDP. Lahlou finds that water privatization has a social constraint given that poverty 
prevents a full cost recovery model from actualizing. The author discusses the  
results of a state study, which finds that the concessionaire, Lydec, has not met its 
contractual obligations, and that this is linked to early distribution of dividends 
(Lahlou, 2008). Lahlou also indicates that Lydec acknowledges its contractual 
limitations; admitting that key variables such as water volumes, yields and prices 
have changed since the contract was established. The author concludes with the  
example of Grenoble, France, where the return to public water provision led to lower 
prices and increased investments.
An ACME-Morocco (2007) article on Lydec discusses the results of a report 
reviewed by Casablanca’s technical committee in preparing to revise the water 
contract with Lydec in late 2006 . The report summarizes missed contractual 
obligations that require revision in the contract for 200 7  to 2027. Based on that 
report, ACME-Morocco finds that the ‘delegating’ authority needs to recover funds 
under the contract due to: (1) a shortfall in securities investment (including early
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dividend issue), and (2) excess of foreign technical assistance fees (ACME-Morocco, 
2007 , near end of translated report paragraph).
ACME-Morocco (2008) citing the findings of an independent Casablanca study 
characterizes Lydec services as “failures, overruns and disrespectful behaviour” in 
reference to contractual obligations (ACME-Morocco, 2 0 0 8 19). The article suggests 
that the original contract negotiation (which bypassed local democratic institutions- 
negotiated by the Moroccan Ministry of Interior) has likely contributed to these 
deficiencies (ACME-Morocco, 2008). The article also points to significant contract 
capital violations: (1) under-expenditure, and that (2) 85% of Lydec’s actual capital 
expenditures comprised transfers to shareholders and “technical assistance” 
suppliers (ACME-Morocco, 2008).
ACME-Morocco (2011) reports a preliminary investigation over the 
accusations that Casablanca’s mayor and Lydec CEO mismanaged public funds. The 
article criticizes the World Bank model of capital funding and investment being 
delegated to the foreign private operator, in contrast to the French model that 
includes public funding and investment (ACME-Morocco, 2011).
The Lahlou and ACME-Morocco articles comprise most of the non-proprietary 
accounts of the Casablanca water privatization case that could be obtained for 
review. Although these documents provide some discussion of water performance 
outcomes for this case, they do not provide a detailed account of the Casablanca 
contract terms and the analysis is brief without elaboration on the reasons for the 
identified privatization failures.
19 The article does not provide a direct citation for the study being referenced. It is indicated that the 
study was published by ACME-Morocco in November 2 00 7  although it could not be found in the ACME- 
Morocco website archives.
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Olivier (2009 ) notes that Casablanca’s households that do not have property 
rights are not eligible to access water subsidies. Olivier discusses that Casablanca 
has a social tariff block of eight cubic metres20, but that it is not effective since in 
many cases multiple households share a connection. The author also explains that 
water authorities’ attempts to reduce the social tariff block to six cubic metres were 
met with protests that returned the tariff to its original level (Olivier, 200 9 ).
La Paz-EI Alto:
In its coverage of the La Paz-EI Alto water privatization, Food and W ater Watch 
(2006) presents an analysis of the results of an independent audit by Pozo y 
Asociados. The audit found that the water company’s financial statements 
overstated fixed asset investments. The audit concluded that over US$ 6  million 
should be levied by the government for contract violations including concession 
underinvestment (Food and Water Watch, 2006). This report is important as it 
contradicts figures previously cited suggesting that the company was meeting 
contractual targets. This report only focuses on specific contract violations though.
In Lobina and Hall (2007), the authors highlight that the La Paz-EI Alto 
concessionaire contract target interpretation included establishing low cost 
connections and using community groups, micro-credit plans and volunteers to 
increase profits (Lobina and Hall, 2 00 7 , p.26-27). The authors also document 
results of the audit (mentioned previously in Food and Water Watch, 2 0 0 6 ), bringing 
rise to the end of the contract, which showed that the company continued to earn an 
actual annual rate of return over 15% during the contract, overstating investment
20 A ‘social’ tariff block is the first level of consumption being provided at no cost per use.
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asset claims, and resulting in a fine (after termination) by the regulator in 2 0 0 6  
(Lobina and Hall, 2007).
Laurie and Crespo (2007) find that the service area under the La Paz-EI Alto 
contract consisted of the pre-existing network area and did not account for un-served 
areas at the contract’s outset. In examining the pro-poor terms of the contract, the 
authors find that the contract did not clearly specify the geographic coverage 
requirements necessary to ensure that poor un-served households would be 
connected to the network. Consequently, they link this finding to an alleged 
manipulation of the coverage figures by the company -  a view supported by the 
superintendent and that contributed to protests (Laurie and Crespo, 2 0 0 7 , p.845). 
Furthermore, although the concessionaire used a pro-poor pricing structure based on 
consumption levels, a 2002  household survey in La Paz and El Alto found that 64%  of 
respondents claimed that prices were beyond their economic capabilities (Laurie and 
Crespo, 2007 , p.847). The authors find that poor households were paying for water 
regardless of whether they used it, due to being charged average rates established 
by the company. Water meters were not installed despite being required by the 
contract (Laurie and Crespo, 2007 , p.847). They also identify that the regulatory 
framework allows for negotiations between the regulator and company without any 
public participation (Laurie and Crespo, 2 0 0 7 , p.851). The authors conclude that the 
regulatory system is weak as reflected in ineffective negotiations with the company, 
including, for example that the company was not held to adhere to a new law calling 
for public consultation pertaining to rates (Laurie and Crespo, 2007, p .851). Finally, 
the authors identify problems with the dual roles of the regulator having authority to
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grant and monitor the concession, and the World Bank being both an investor and 
administrator of concessions (Laurie and Crespo, p.852).
Dardenne (2006) suggests that cooperative partnerships to serve the poor 
work provided capital financing is sourced elsewhere. The author identifies that a 
portion of La Paz-EI Alto’s population was excluded from the concession, and 
highlights that El Alto has a high growth rate (5.1%) and two-thirds of the population 
are under the poverty line. As a result, the 97% city water coverage claimed as of 
2 0 0 1  was closer to 60%-65% (Dardenne, 2006 , p.8).
In addition to its positive view of the La Paz-EI Alto concession, Morales et al.
(2006) finds that social tensions related to coverage and consumption were 
exacerbated by rising unemployment and decreasing income and quality of 
employment (Morales et al., 2006 , p.50-51). Policy recommendations suggested 
include better contracts that consider the geography and distribution (Citing Konives, 
1999), a different water tariff system that includes cross-subsidies, and efficient 
regulatory norms and institutions (Morales et al., p.51).
Guayaquil:
Swyngedouw (2004) discusses factors that have influenced the urbanization 
of water in Guayaquil, up to privatization. The author outlines Guayaquil’s historical 
background, illustrating how local interests, state and international financier power 
have constructed water scarcity. The author outlines Guayaquil’s geography, 
emphasizing that poor peripheral neighbourhoods developed quickly and ineffectively 
on the low lying estuary in the south, and the hills in the north -  both with obsolete 
water and sewerage infrastructure (Swyngedouw, 2004 ). The author also discusses 
the growing importance and authorities’ acceptance of tanqueros (private water
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trucks) in serving primarily poor un-serviced areas. Swyngedouw extensively 
examines the relationships between interest groups, (the controlling of) nature, a 
chronically deficient management system, the disproportionate emphasis on a 
productivist view, and the resulting problems leading to privatization (Swyngedouw,
2004).
Swyngedouw provides important insight into the role of societal classes in 
influencing the direction of policy in Guayaquil which does not support meeting urban 
water service needs.
Cesar Cardenas (2008) with Observatorio Cuidadano de Servicios Publicos 
(OCSP, Citizen’s Public Service Observatory), a citizen’s watchdog for Guayaquil, has 
written a statement citing reasons that the water contract with the concessionaire, 
Interagua, should be terminated and replaced with an autonomous municipal service 
authority that includes consumer and citizen participation. Reasons cited primarily 
relate to a lack of contract compliance and legal infractions. Cardenas (2008 ) 
highlights infractions such as water price increases that violate consumer laws and 
inequitably affect the poor, collection methods illegally based on estimated 
consumption, and sewerage services without secondary treatment (Cardenas, 2008 ).
Cardenas’ statement cites several concession failures but is essentially a 
summary statement, apparently based on the OCSP’s work.
Food and Water Watch (2009b) concludes that water privatization in 
Guayaquil has failed having provided poor service and jeopardized public health, 
particularly that of children. This article references reports from the press as well as 
the OCSP. Again, this report is rather cursory. Along with Cardenas’ statement, these 
sources provide compelling evidence, although sources are not necessarily cited.
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Joiner (2007) outlines the Guayaquil water privatization’s social and 
environmental impacts, including specific case studies of Guayaquil neighbourhoods: 
Guasmo Sur, Isla Trinitaria, Flor Bastion and Mapasingue. The author concludes that 
the water, sewage and drainage concession agreement was poorly written, relieving 
the concessionaire of clear, measurable performance and social obligations. For 
example, the author notes that the contract does not consider the need to exclude 
the non-functioning existing water network from coverage figures (Joiner, 2 0 0 7 , 
p.35). Furthermore, Joiner finds that the initial and subsequent five year plans 
neither adequately accounted for social objectives to provide for or improve services 
in poor neighbourhoods, nor obligated Interagua to provide financial and technical 
resources to water and sewerage infrastructure activities (Joiner, 2 0 0 7 , Chapter 11). 
The author discusses OCSP’s inception in 2005 , for increased transparency and 
accountability in the administration and regulation of public services. Joiner states 
that problems are, “deeply rooted in the government’s apparent ineffectiveness in 
addressing the social needs of the remarkably poor population (Joiner, 2 0 0 7 , p .12).” 
Joiner notes that consumers have been left outside the network water services due 
to Interagua’s inefficiencies. In reference to the regulator ECAPAG’s establishment, 
the author states, “No portion of the [ECAPAG] legally binding documentation 
mentions specific standards or measurements to evaluate these two [public and 
environmental health] goals (Joiner, 2007 , p.20).”
Joiner’s report is the most extensive assessment of the Guayaquil case. It 
does not provide any quantitative performance data or assessment though. The 
author’s examination of the privatization to date is critical of all aspects as pertaining 
to consumers, particularly the poor.
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The literature reviewed in this section has generally viewed water privatization 
as a failure or highlighted failed aspects of the privatizations. These authors have 
identified specific water privatization failures and underlying contributing reasons, 
such as international influences, political issues, economic problems, weak 
contracts, ineffective policy and regulation, and specific violations by companies. The 
reviewed literature has generally focused on individual cases though. Furthermore, 
governance is generally not included as a critical element of analysis in many of 
these studies.
2.3 Governance & Regulatory Issues - Lessons & Failures
This section includes literature covering water governance and regulation 
specific to the water concession contracts and services for the six cases, and /or that 
provides relevant examination of these topics for these cases. Generally speaking, 
this literature provides more focus on governance and regulatory issues with less 
emphasis on the nature of the contracts, political roles (including international 
influences) and performance outcomes, except where noted.
Water governance can be defined as the relationship between governments, 
the private sector, political parties, civil organizations, NGOs, international 
institutions, and other relevant entities with power (Miranda et al., 2 0 1 1 , p.4, citing 
Castro, 2007). Water governance is also “about dealing with uncertainty, conflict and 
corruption” (Miranda et al., 2011 , p. 6). These authors distinguish between the view 
of water governance outside of cities, within cities, and a holistic approach 
accounting for ‘up-to-downstream’ factors (Miranda e ta l., 2011 , p.9).21
21 For purposes of this thesis, urban water governance is considered in the context of state and other 
levels of governments’ responsibilities in maintaining and regulating urban water resources, services 
and the relationships between government, private sector contractor(s) and users of water. As water
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Buenos Aires:
Laborde (2005) writes on the institutional framework of water tariffs in 
Buenos Aires. The author notes that the Argentinean economic crisis and Buenos 
Aires water company’s debt could not have been predicted or avoided. She refers to 
lack of public disclosure by the water company, a significant reduction in water tariffs 
of 26.9%  for a utility already in debt, and the consequent inability to finance network 
expansion at the prevailing user rates, as well as the lack of accurate information at 
the time of the bid as the primary reasons for the company’s failure (Laborde, 2005 ). 
This article discusses some legal aspects of the concession agreement and the 
complex tariff system.
Porporato and Robbins (2010) discuss the causes of the failure of the Buenos 
Aires water concession with particular focus on corporate governance. Drawing from 
the literature, the authors indicate the need for government participation in water 
governance due to externalities, the need for information due to externalities, and 
pricing difficulties (Porporato and Robbins, 2010). The authors conclude that the 
Buenos Aires water privatization had a weak regulatory body with a poorly defined 
regulatory framework, and weak post-privatization governance mechanisms 
(Porporato and Robbins, 2010).
Engel et al. (2011) identify lessons for water sustainability in the face of the 
Global South’s continuing urbanization. The authors find that poverty was increasing 
in metropolitan Buenos Aires (30% in 1995), and that it is estimated that about 30%  
of urban lands are made up of informal settlements preventing water and sanitation
concession agreements are primarily concerned with services and infrastructure within specific 
boundaries, water governance is also considered within these parameters.
31
network expansion. Citing Jordan et al. (2010), the authors conclude that, 
“Governance issues, institutional weaknesses and lack of control mechanisms are 
responsible for the failure of the [Buenos Aires] concession” (Engel et al., 2011, 
P-30).
Jakarta:
The Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB, 2009) reviews water 
privatization in Jakarta ten years after implementation. The study makes several 
recommendations including engaging in adaptive regulation to support performance 
improvements, coordination between contract parties to allow for benchmarking, 
monitoring and evaluation, the need for participatory mechanisms that involve the 
public in decision making processes, and the importance of transparency of the  
JWSRB and stakeholders (JWSRB, 2 00 9 , p .1 4 4 ,1 5 0 ,1 5 2 ). Nugroho (2011 ), a 
board member of the JWSRB until 2 01 1 , finds the creation of JWSRB as an 
independent and impartial institution potentially influencing good water governance 
in future (as opposed to changes that would occur in its absence) (Nugroho, 201 1 ).
Bakker et al. (2008) argues that governance failures have created 
disincentives to connect the poor to water in Jakarta. The authors find that even at 
higher income levels surveyed, most households used a combination of water 
sources that did not include network water (Bakker et al., 2008). The study 
concludes that all water providers should be subject to regulation with clear 
governance standards “such as accountability, transparency, participation, 
inclusiveness and the rule of law” (Bakker et al., 2008 , p.1907). The article in 
general indicates that the water governance model does not effectively address the 
formal water network or informal vendor water.
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Bakker et al. (2006) highlight the spatial and social differentiation of water 
access in Jakarta. The authors identify historical precedence responsible for 
inequities in water provision that perpetuate poverty (through, for example, sourcing 
alternative water at higher prices). The authors cite continuing disincentives to 
connect the poor such as: a culture of governance not prioritizing the poor in policy 
(citing Kusno, 1997, Woodcock, 200 5 ) and no legal requirements to service the poor, 
full cost recovery objectives (Taylor, 1983), and no formal mechanisms to stop urban 
expansion even though water network expansion has been limited in scope (Bakker 
et al., 2006 , p.18-19). Bakker et al. (2006 ) identifies critical governance issues 
pertaining to water provision in Jakarta.
Similarly, Kurniasih’s (2008) review of the Jakarta water privatization 
highlights governance and regulation as fundamental problems. Governance 
problems identified include legislation, and lack of tendering, public involvement, and 
transparency (Kurniasih, 2008). Kurniasih concludes that the monitoring agency, 
JWSRB has limited authority and resources and is constrained by the water contracts 
preventing sanctions for non-compliance (Kurniasih, 2008 , p.8). In conclusion, the 
author recommends a model of community-based water management, which is 
connected to Indonesia’s strong traditional roots (Kurniasih, 2008, p.17).
Manila:
Cuaresma (2006) examines the water and sewerage service programs, 
specifically for the poor in Greater Manila, in order to determine lessons for 
regulation. The author identifies some loopholes such as high dependence on group 
taps and non-regulation of pricing. Cuaresma points out the need for regulation
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conducted by an independent, trusted institution of government including public and 
civil society group participation.
A Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC, 2 0 0 5 ) paper discusses the failures of 
the West Manila concession (Maynilad). The FDC paper discusses a public health 
failure in 2 0 0 3  where 600  residents of poor communities became ill from gastro­
intestinal diseases, of which six died. An FDC requested laboratory test showed that 
Maynilad’s water supply had E.Coli bacteria of more than 7 0 0  percent of the amount 
allowed under the national standard (FDC, 2005 , p.13). The authors find that 
Maynilad’s concession fees payable to the government being converted to equity in 
2 004 , acted to shift the company’s creditor debt obligations to the government (FDC, 
2005). The paper illustrates that the water authority, Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sewerage System (MWSS) incurred US$ 4 3 0  million in additional loans from 2 0 0 1  to 
2004 , and then arranged for a US$ 1 25  million loan from the World Bank, of which 
$ 3 1  million was to be provided to Maynilad company operations (p.9). The paper 
continues that a significant (50%) water tariff increase and departure of the local 
shareholder from the West Manila concession transferred the concessionaire’s debt 
obligations to the west zone consumers. The FDC concludes with regulatory failures: 
(1) the MWSS Board is comprised of presidential appointees, (2) the MWSS 
Regulatory Office’s (MWSS RO’s) mandate is limited to regulation of the contract, and 
(3) there is a conflict of interest given that the regulator and companies’ offices are in 
the same building (and that the contract includes terms that disallow such an 
arrangement) (FDC, 2005 , p.14-15).
Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC, 200 9 ) examines the Manila privatization 
case in a ten year review, documenting and assessing contract issues, financing
34
background, regulatory (in) effectiveness and recommending the need for a 
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. The report summarizes various impacts of the  
privatization including: corporate taxes being passed to the consumer, access by the 
poor being inhibited by connection charges, the poor having to access more 
expensive alternative sources, and concessionaires charging the resellers the highest 
rates for bulk water -  which are passed on to the poor (FDC, 2009, p.5, 39). The 
report discusses the issue of ‘regulatory capture’, suggesting that the regulatory 
system, its mechanisms and people are susceptible to conflicts of interest and 
corrupt practices (FDC, 2009 , p.38). The report reiterates previous comments that 
the government had to settle for only partial payment on additional debt obligations 
resulting from its dispute and termination of Maynilad’s agreement (FDC, 2 0 0 9 , 
p.36). The report discusses numerous court challenges made to attem pt to overturn 
actions taken by the water authority and companies to deem them agents of the 
water authority rather than classify them as public utilities (which implies various 
responsibilities to the public). FDC (2009 ) concludes that the water authority’s 
(MWSS’s) actions have acted to ‘shield’ the companies from their accountability 
(FDC, 2 0 0 9 , p.48).
Finally, Kumar (2009) explores institutional designs for water privatization in a 
dissertation that includes a Manila case study. Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
official interviews indicated that the regulator, MWSS Regulatory Office (MWSS RO), 
is not independent from government (Kumar, 2 0 0 9 , p.211). Interviews also revealed 
the opinion that Manila Water’s (East concession) practice of selling bulk water and 
taking credit for increased water coverage should be addressed (Kumar, 2 0 0 9 , 
p.221). The author finds that the rebasing exercise which controls tariffs and rates of
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return puts limits on investment, limiting network expansion (Kumar, 2 0 0 9 , p .223).
In reference to an implied lack of consumer participation, Kumar finds that 
accountability is the “the most serious concern” relating to the water privatization 
(Kumar, 2009 , p.228). He concludes that water privatization can work but requires 
that the government must first build its technical and financial capacity (Kumar, 
2009). Furthermore, Kumar finds that additional state preconditions for privatization 
are necessary; such as clearer laws, higher regulatory authority and potentially 
disallowing foreign company involvement (to address domestic public sensitivities) 
(Kumar, 2 00 9 , p.302-303).
The sources reviewed on Manila in this section provide a general critique of 
the regulator, rebasing process, and court challenges. They provide only a general 
view of the exposed complexities of the established and lacking regulatory system. 
However, there could be more attention to the regulatory system's relationship to the 
changing contract terms and resulting outcomes.
Casablanca
Saadi (2012) identifies various shortcomings and lessons of the Casablanca
\
water and sanitation concession. The author finds that the concessionaire has 
underperformed on its contract obligations during the first ten years, and that the  
governance model limits social accountability (Saadi, 2012). As with a few previous 
authors covering this case, such as (e.g. Lahlou, 2 0 0 8  and ACME-Morocco, 2008), 
Saadi reports on audit findings showing company connection installation and 
investment targets underperformance (2012 , p. 382). The audit also identified 
reporting gaps relating to unbilled revenues (Saadi, p.385). Saadi concludes that 
power imbalances between levels of government, as well as the company’s
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experience as a global power, prevent social accountability (Saadi, p .386, 392 ). 
Finally, this author also identifies that pricing objectives to alleviate issues for 
inhabitants of Greater Casablanca are not addressed in the recent renegotiation of 
the contract (Saadi, p.386). This author has provided some critical assessments of 
the Casablanca privatization where no other academic literature has been identified. 
Guayaquil:
An International Finance Corporation/Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (IFC/MIGA, 2008) Ombudsman report outlines the mediation between 
Guayaquil’s water provider, Interagua, and citizens, in response to a complaint by 
OCSP and another Guayaquil NGO. The key issues raised in the complaint included: 
residential water cuts, lack of service expansion, contractual non-compliance, and 
public health problems due to improper water treatment (IFC/MIGA, 2 0 0 8 ).
Interagua agreed to remedy the situation with respect to affected users, including 
forgiving customer debts and flexible payment plans. The IFC/MIGA report concludes 
that a future dialogue has been opened and proposes subsequent multi-stakeholder 
meetings (IFC/MIGA, 2008).
Carrillo et al. (2006) finds that the Guayaquil water privatization needs a 
network expansion focus without direct (additional) costs to neighbourhoods. The 
authors point out that the regulator, ECAPAG, initially controlled water prices, but that 
an increasing number of complaints arose for poor service with increased charges 
(Carrillo et al., 2006 , p.9-10). The authors identify a 6.1% reduction in water 
coverage between 1994  and 2004  in rural parts of Guayaquil (Carrillo et al., 2006 ). 
While the authors find a lack of improvements in water services during the initial 
years of privatization in Guayaquil, they caution that water privatization cannot be
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identified as the cause of these performance results (Carrillo et al., 2 0 0 6 ). In
reference to the regulator’s water pre-privatization role and the focus on providing
services to poor neighbourhoods, Carrillo et al. (2006 ) conclude that:
...less emphasis needs to be placed on whether the provider of that good is public 
or private and more emphasis needs to be directed at improving their institutional 
capacity to provide those services in an efficient, transparent and accountable 
manner, (p.56)
This report provides some insight to the Guayaquil privatization; although the 
regulatory framework is not viewed as an element of privatization.
The literature reviewed in this section raises issues relating to governance and 
regulation for several of the six case cities. The specific topics have varied by 
objective and method. The primary gaps identified within this group of literature 
relate to elements of governance and regulation, with less or no focus on contract 
terms, contextual influences affecting the contract model and renegotiation (e.g. 
international influence on governance), and/or service outcomes.
2.4  Summary Comments on the Literature Reviewed
The literature reviewed in this chapter spans a variety of subtopics generally 
examining the six water privatization concessions on an individual basis. A 
significant portion of the literature has concluded that specific water privatization 
cases have been a failure, or that various lessons have been learned from the 
privatization experience to date. As the objective of this thesis is to draw robust 
lessons from the critical examination of water privatization, comparative multiple 
case studies are particularly relevant. However, very few comparative studies were 
identified and reviewed in this chapter. Studies such as those of the Public Services 
International Research Unit (PSIRU, Lobina and Hall, Hall et al.) examine different
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types of privatization, while generally advocating for public water provision. The 
ideology inherent in these studies is that private sector involvement and related 
formal international influences are simply inappropriate. Collectively this source’s 
body of literature may critically examine water privatization by case, but this is not 
readily apparent based on the individual reports reviewed. Additional studies were 
identified that do not provide value to this thesis, such as Marin (2009 ), which 
focuses on the ideological objective of determining what the private sector’s role 
should be rather than asking whether the policy direction to date has been 
successful.
Individual case literature has generally focused on specific issues such as 
water tariffs, poor households, or contractual issues. The available literature 
reviewed does not consistently critically examine the six water privatization cases in a 
comprehensive manner that outlines the terms of the contracts, the governance 
model’s elements and effectiveness, the ‘contextual’ factors (e.g. Political and 
international factors, and economic crises), and water privatization outcomes. 
Moreover, the literature is generally lacking analysis of these factors across 
comparable case models in the Global South.
As mentioned in Chapter One, this thesis follows a systematic approach to 
compare the six water privatization cases from various aspects related to contractual 
terms, regulation, governance, water coverage as well as external and contextual 
factors. The following chapter provides some historical background for each of the six 
water concession cases.
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CHAPTER THREE: CASE BACKGROUNDS
The six water concessions examined in this thesis were initially negotiated as 
25- to 30- year agreements. Five of the six concessions include sewerage service 
commitments within the contract scope.22 The concession implementations have 
involved ongoing legislative and policy reforms, contract renegotiations and 
terminations, water network expansions, related capital and technological upgrades, 
as well as various disputes. Companies have been responsible for obtaining and 
providing all necessary capital investment.
The following sections provide background on the case cities and their 
respective nations, including the lead up to and implementation of water 
privatization, and key relevant aspects of the arrangements. These cases include 
Buenos Aires, Jakarta, Manila, Casablanca, La Paz-EI Alto and Guayaquil, 
respectively.
3 .1  Buenos Aires, Argentina (1 9 9 3  -  200 6 )
Argentina is a former Spanish colony, becoming an independent republic in 
the 19 th century. The country has gone through periods of military rule, including 
from 1 9 7 6  to 1983 . In the 1970s, water sector responsibilities were decentralized 
to provincial governments. The city of Buenos Aires has been an autonomous district 
since 1 8 8 0  and was granted autonomy in a 199 4  constitutional amendment.
Buenos Aires is one of South America’s largest ports, with navigable river waters to 
the north-east part of the country, accessing Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Buenos
22 Sewerage services may comprise household sewer connections, drainage systems, sewage 
treatment, and sanitation services (such as septic tank de-sludging), as well as related capital 
infrastructure. Jakarta's agreement has excluded sewerage services.
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Aires’ economy consists primarily of services (76% financial, real estate, advertising, 
and hotels) and manufacturing (16%).
Following a period of increased unemployment and high inflation, Carlos 
Menem was elected President in 1989 , and with IMF support, passed a law allowing 
him sole authority to pass a privatization decree for public utilities. The Government 
fixed its exchange rate and negotiated bilateral agreements to promote and protect 
foreign investment (Laborde, 2005). In December 1992, with direct loan and 
advisory support from the World Bank, a 3 0  year water and sewerage concession 
was signed for Buenos Aires with Aguas Argentinas, a consortium headed by 
Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez (Now ‘Suez’) with additional minority ownership from its 
Spanish partner AgBar, as well as Banco de Galicia, Vivendi, company employees, 
and Anglian Water. In 1994, the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) acquired a 5% share. At the time, much of the water and sewerage system was 
over 60  years old and was experiencing shortages and interruptions. The intention of 
the privatization was to obtain private financing for physical infrastructure, and to 
reduce related public deficits (Galiani et al., 2005). Aguas Argentinas offered a water 
tariff reduction of 26.9% to secure the contract. The contractor committed to 
increasing water coverage to 100% from 70% and sewerage coverage from 58%  to 
95%. Information regarding the existing infrastructure was unavailable or not 
forthcoming during the bid process, although there was a contractual stipulation that 
the government was not to be responsible for the quality of information provided to 
the bidding process (Alcazar et al., 2000). Initial contract terms put limits on 
consumption charges per user which were to be authorized by the new regulator, 
Tripartite Entity of Works and Sanitation Services’ (ETOSS). Within the first year, tariff
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rate increases were approved, prior to rate reviews prescribed by the contract 
(Laborde, 2005).
The institutional framework included national, provincial, and city level 
officials co-governing the regulator, ETOSS. ETOSS was widely considered to be a 
weak institution from its inception. The previous non-transparent and complex water 
tariff structure remained. ETOSS was later moved under Ministry of Environment 
authority, which removed it from contract renegotiations which took place beginning 
in 1997. Tariff regulations were changed. Improvement charges for customers were 
added prior to agreed-to service expansion and quality improvements. Service 
compensation was to be based on a fixed U.S. dollar exchange rate. At the time, 
ETOSS warned national authorities that the company had only met one-third of 
infrastructure expansion targets and spent only one-fifth of the sewage connection 
investment target. In the late 1990s contract renegotiations permitted water tariffs 
increases. However, in 2001 -2002 , a four-fold devaluation of the Argentine Peso led 
to tariffs being frozen. From 199 3  to 2 00 2 , average residential water tariffs 
increased 87.9% , while the corresponding Consumer Price Index had increased only 
7.3% (Castro and Azpiazu, 2012).The water company had incurred U S $706 million in 
foreign financial debt, thought to be primarily from outsourcing activities (Laborde,
2005).
In 2006 , the concession agreement was rescinded due to contract failure. 
Public cases against the company and its partners occurred in Argentinean courts. 
The concessionaire claimants sued the Argentine Republic in the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) on the basis of failing to adhere to 
previously agreed tariff adjustments, among other complaints. In 2 0 1 0 , the ICSID
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ruled partially in favour of the concessionaire claimants on matters relating to fair 
and equitable treatment of the companies’ investments (International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2010).
3 .2  Jakarta, Indonesia (1998  - )
Indonesia is a former Dutch colony, gaining its independence after the Second 
World War. President Suharto ruled the country under a military regime from 1 9 6 6  
until the late 1990s when he resigned bringing back a democratic republic. 
Indonesia’s economy consists of agriculture and manufacturing with a rise in natural 
resource sectors -  forestry, oil and gas, and minerals. Indonesia’s colonial past has 
had great influence on the structure of Jakarta, where the infrastructure developed in 
the late 19th century around the wealthy colonial settlements. The government has 
been highly centralized. As of the early 1990s, the World Bank was advising the 
Suharto government to privatize water, and with it came reforms for decentralization 
of government involvement in water.
In 1990s, Pam Jaya, the city owned water utility for Jakarta, was running at a 
loss, had an aging infrastructure, and little access to additional capital financing. The 
utility was being regulated under city government supervision. In 1 99 5 , President 
Suharto started the process toward water privatization in Jakarta (and other 
jurisdictions that followed). In 1998 , with support from the World Bank, two 2 5  year 
private water concession agreements were negotiated and implemented, dividing the 
city into two concession areas. These agreements included all water services, but 
excluded network sanitation services. The West Jakarta concession is held by a 
partnership led by Suez (PT Pam Lyonnaise Jaya or Palyja). Thames W ater (UK) 
initially led the East Jakarta water concession partnership. The West concession
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initially included Sigit as a partner, a Suharto family company. The East contract 
included the Salim Group, linked to a Suharto associate (see for example, Bakker et 
al., 2006). As of 2007 , the West concession’s ownership consisted of Suez 51%, 
Astra International 30% and Citigroup 19%. In the East, Thames withdrew and 
Acuatico took over 95%  share of the water services, with Alberta Utilities holding 5% 
(referring to the utility as Aetra).23
The Jakarta water concessions have been controversial from their inception 
given a lack of improvement in services and public consultation with significant water 
price increases. A formal transition included authority to close private water wells. 
Initially, the private companies earned revenues by billing Pam Jaya (which continued 
as the city’s water authority) based on water volumes sold. The Asian financial crisis 
(1998) brought a significant devaluation of the Indonesian Rupiah putting the water 
authority deeper into debt. At the same time, the Suharto government fell. Despite 
pressures to return to public control, the concessions were renegotiated in 2 0 0 1 .
The international companies purchased the local shares, adjusting compensation 
terms, and influencing subsequent water price increases. The concession 
agreements protected the companies’ rates of return (22% guarantees) through 
foreign exchange, interest rate and tax protections. Furthermore, service coverage 
and non-revenue water targets were reduced. Corresponding water tariff increases 
occurred amidst lobbying from non-governmental organizations, newspapers and the 
public (Argo & Laquian, 2007).
The concessionaires extended water networks to the edge of poor 
neighbourhoods; then local leaders arranged for private contractors to extend water
23 Information on ownership is reported by various sources. See, for example, JWSRB (2009).
44
to households or standpipes. Many of these poor areas are informal settlements in 
hazardous zones -  riverbanks, along canals and streams, on flood plains, in garbage 
dumps, and along railroad tracks (Argo & Laquian, 2007).
Jakarta’s water model principles are based on achieving full cost recovery with 
a fair return on investment (ROI), including: consumer affordability, demand 
management, simplicity, and transparency according to Wyatt (2005), although this 
view is contested. The contracts did not outline clear monitoring roles for Pam Jaya 
or the Jakarta Water Supply Regulation Body (JWSRB) which monitors the contracts, 
customer issues, and administers automatic water tariff increases.
In addition to previous infrastructure and privatization loans, to facilitate 
necessary legal and regulatory changes and physical infrastructure, the World Bank's 
Water Resources Sector Adjustment Loan (WATSAL) was arranged in 1 99 9 . The 
Indonesian Government was slow to meet conditions of this loan, such as complying 
with irrigation management decentralization in its eventual Water Resources Law 
(2004). Significant protests occurred in response to the new law, including the 
People’s Coalition for the Rights to Water (KRuHA) filing a case in opposition of the  
Law in the new Constitutional Court; arguing that it is contrary to Constitution terms 
to turn over the government's responsibilities to the private sector. The legal case 
was specifically attempting to prevent a 40%  water rate hike. Argo and Laquian
(2007) reported:
The court ruled that the companies were not allowed to raise their tariffs 'until 
they can provide better services and proper information to the customers about 
their operations' (p. 239 , citing Hudiono 2 00 4 , Jakarta Post).
The companies also procured private financing. For example, Palyja initially 
received US $ 6 1  million in loans from European and Asian banks, and has continued
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to roll over its loan obligations through a bond issue on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange and a more recent Asian Development Bank loan intended for capital 
expenditures.
3 .3  Manila, Philippines (1997  - )
Metropolitan Manila is the Philippines’ political and economic centre, and its 
principal port, accounting for one-third of the country’s GDP. The city has a diverse 
economy including various industrial-related goods from chemicals to textiles, 
coconut oil, tobacco, food-processing, and financial and publishing sectors.
The Philippines was a colony of Spain, and later the U.S. until World War II, 
which included Japanese occupation. The Philippines gained independence as of 
1946, experiencing democracy until 197 2  when Ferdinand Marcos ruled under a 
dictatorship that ended in 1986. Marcos' reign involved highly centralized control of 
various sector services that would have otherwise been controlled by the private 
sector (Dumol, 2000). As of 1986, President Aquino started reforms to privatize 
public services, which were later continued by her successor Ramos. As of the early 
1990s, water and sewerage distribution authority, coupled with aging systems, were 
being decentralized to local government levels. As of 1995 , the Water Crisis Act was 
used to fast track private sector participation in the water sector (PSIRU, 2 0 0 5 ). 
Water privatization plans were introduced to relieve debts from previous IFI loans 
from the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC). The World Bank designed and advised on a water concession bid 
and contract process.
In 1997 , the Philippines entered into the largest water privatization in the 
world, when separate contracts were negotiated for East and West Manila. In 1997 ,
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the privatization of Manila's Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) 
involved the water authority contracting two private sector water and sewerage 
concession agreements for East and West Manila. Maynilad Water, owned by Suez 
and a local company, Benpres, controlled by the Lopez family, became the contractor 
for West Manila. Manila Water, a partnership between UK-based United Utilities, 
Bechtel (USA), Mitsubishi Corporation (Japan) and local company Ayala, negotiated a 
water concession agreement for East Manila. Ownership structure in Manila Water 
has altered since its inception with Bechtel and Edison (Italy) selling their respective 
shares in International Water Ltd. to the other two companies in 2003 .
In West Manila, water prices increased four-fold between 199 7  and 2003; 
however, Maynilad could neither meet service objectives nor achieve profitable 
status, which led to contract amendments and court disputes. As of 2 0 0 2 , Maynilad 
gave early notice of contract termination. In 2004 , the government took control of 
the West concession, bought out the private company shares in 2006 , and in 2 0 0 7  
DMCI Holdings and Metro Pacific Investments Corporation successfully bid for an 
84% stake in Maynilad Water, replacing the previous concessionaire (see for 
example, FDC, 2009).
Manila’s water concession model continues today with the water authority and 
its regulatory office overseeing the contracted services (e.g. Negishi, 201 0 ).
3 .4  Casablanca, Morocco (1997  - )
Casablanca (Arabic: Ad Dar al Bayda) is Morocco’s largest city, economic 
centre and key port for African-European trade. Most of Morocco was part of the 
French Protectorate over the first part of the twentieth century, with Spanish 
occupation in the north, including the Strait of Gibraltar. In 1956, Morocco gained its
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independence and transformed into a constitutional monarchy. The southwest area, 
identified internationally as part of the country, is referred to as Western Sahara, and 
remains a disputed territory. Morocco’s economy relies on agriculture, industry and 
manufacturing, and tourism and services. Agriculture accounts for 20%  of GDP and 
employs 40%  of the labour force. Morocco is the world’s largest exporter of 
phosphates (The Heritage Foundation, 2012). Casablanca is Morocco’s main 
financial centre, and port, and is reliant on industrial activity, manufacturing and 
tourism. In 2006 , Morocco became the only African nation to enter into a bilateral 
agreement with the United States.
During the 1980s, Morocco received loans from the IMF to initiate austerity 
measures. During the m id-1990’s the country decentralized its river basin 
management. In 1997 , Casablanca’s water distribution services were privatized, 
contracting the consortium Lydec (Lyonnaise des Eaux Casablanca), through a 30  
year concession agreement. Lydec is operated by Suez and its subsidiaries (60%  
shareholder, later 51%), with additional shareholders, private Moroccan companies 
RMA Watanya (15%), Fipar Holding (20%), and equity subscribers on the Casablanca 
Stock Exchange (14%, IPO 2005) (MEED, 2005). Initially, the Moroccan private 
shares were held by French and Spanish utility companies. The scope of the  
concession agreement included water, sewerage, and electricity provision, and later 
included additional cities (Rabat, Tangiers, Tetouan). The contract also included 
terms for water reservoir expansion. The concession contract was awarded without 
competitive tender. As Casablanca is prone to flooding, drainage network 
management was included in the contract scope. Casablanca’s water and sanitation
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regulatory framework includes municipal level regulation.24 A technical committee 
made up of municipal and state government and company representation oversees 
the contract. The Casablanca service area initially included an estimated population 
of 3 .5  million inhabitants. One-third of this population, and the greater city area of 
about 4 .5  million, lives in illegal settlements25, which were primarily outside the city’s 
water network at the beginning of privatization (Lydec reports; UN-HABITAT, 2008 ).
Suez (under former names) had previously provided water services during the 
first half of the twentieth century, during French and Spanish occupation of Morocco. 
Casablanca’s domestic water tariffs differ based on separate subcontracting 
operators’ supply costs.26 In 2000 , Lydec borrowed $ 80  million in Moroccan 
Dirhams from Moroccan banks to finance network expansion during the first five 
years of the concession. The company later initiated a public stock offering on the 
Casablanca Stock Exchange. Water decentralization has continued in Morocco with 
full decentralization of Moroccan water management being initiated by the national 
government in 2002 . Several public and private entities provide water services 
across the country, including a public national entity supplying local regions (See, for 
example, Jamati, 2003).
In 2 00 6 , Casablanca’s social water tariff block was reduced from eight to six 
cubic metres, but protests influenced reversal of this decision and related tariff 
increases. A year earlier, the World Bank supported the National Human 
Development Initiative (INDH), focusing on subsidizing basic services for poor
24 Although city power supply is included in the contract, this service aspect is not directly referenced.
25 This is generally consistent with slum population figures at the beginning of the contracts, as shown 
later in Table 5.1.
26 Detailed documentation or reference to subcontractor arrangements or tariff structure could not be 
identified.
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households. Almost 8 0 0 ,0 0 0  Casablanca inhabitants were eligible for the program’s 
water and sanitation subsidies. In 2 0 0 8  and 2009 , following an audit, the  
concession contract was renegotiated limiting the rate of return, revising tariff 
conditions (removal of automatic increases), and re-establishing investment targets 
(Saadi, 2012 , Olivier, 2009).
3 .5  La Paz-EI Alto, Bolivia (1997  -  2 00 5 )
The La Paz-EI Alto urban metropolitan area is the second largest city in Bolivia. 
El Alto developed as a suburb of La Paz and is today referred to as a satellite city 
(collectively described as La Paz-EI Alto herein). Most published statistics still 
disaggregate these two parts of the urban area. Bolivia has a high prevalence of 
poverty and inequality. As of 2002 , La Paz had almost 30%  of the population below 
the poverty line, and high inequality (Gini Coefficient of 0 .578), while El Alto has 
experienced over 60% in poverty and more than 25%  of the population in extreme 
poverty (Morales et al., 2006 , citing the Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (INE)).
Bolivia’s economy primarily consists of mining, agriculture and manufacturing. 
Bolivia has the world’s second largest tin deposits. La Paz-EI Alto’s economy includes 
production of food, tobacco, clothing, various consumer goods, construction 
materials and agricultural tools. Its economy is also dependent on an increasing 
informal economy.
In the 1980s, Bolivia went through periods of hyperinflation and then 
macroeconomic policies for stabilization. In the 1990s, structural reforms continued, 
including IFI debt relief and related conditions under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiatives. In the late 1990s  and into the 2000s, economic shocks 
persisted. Some suggest that weak fiscal and financial sectors combined with only
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modest growth in exports have left Bolivia vulnerable to shocks (e.g. Morales et al.,
2006). In 1997, La Paz-EI Alto’s water and sewerage services were privatized 
through a concession contract with France’s Lyonnaise des Eaux(Suez), replacing 
SAMAPA (the Municipal Autonomous Service for the Provision of Water and Sewer 
Services), the city’s water provider until that time. The concession agreement 
included specific connection targets, particularly to expand services in El Alto. The 
concession was regulated by a national government body. Direct financing for the 
concession process and transfer were supported by the World Bank. As the water 
concession fell short of expansion targets, coinciding with economic problems ailing 
La Paz-EI Alto’s poor, protests began as of 2 00 3 , leading to the President’s 
resignation. In 2005 , after further civil protests, the Bolivian government agreed to 
terminate the water concession, which officially ended in January 2 0 0 7 .
As a side note, and as mentioned previously, after the initiation of the 
concession in La Paz-EI Alto, a concession agreement was awarded to a consortium 
led by Bechtel for Cochabamba, Bolivia. The contract led to immediate significant 
increases in water rates, but was met with mass social protest which resulted in the 
contract being almost immediately rescinded.
3 .6  Guayaquil, Ecuador (2 0 0 1  - )
Guayaquil is Ecuador’s largest city, in the province of Guayas, on the southern 
coast. More than 75% of the city’s population has migrated over the last 5 0  years. 
The fast growth caused the city to develop without urban planning, leading to many 
informal settlements (Joiner, 2007). Part of Guayaquil’s geography includes low 
lands prone to flooding, which along with a rainy climate, add to the hardships of a 
lack of water and sewerage services for Guayaquil’s poor (Joiner, 2007).
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Ecuador was under Spanish rule prior to the 20 th Century, before various 
political phases leading to military rule from 197 2  to 1979. In the 1980s, Ecuador 
was under democratic rule, but with numerous tumultuous periods of presidential 
turn over. Ecuador has also had a history marred by ongoing military conflicts due to 
border disputes with Peru, until the late 1990s.
Ecuador’s economy is heavily dependent on the export of natural resources, 
particularly oil, and agricultural commodities. In the 1970s, the oil boom provided a 
direct financing source and incentive for loan agencies to support water projects. A 
new public water company was established for Guayaquil in 1960. Several 
transitions of authority between national and municipal level control occurred up until 
the amalgamation and shift of water and sewerage utilities to regulatory roles in the 
late 1990s leading up to water privatization.
Private consultancy and engineering companies were involved in water and 
sewage planning as of 196 1  and again in 1978 . Water treatment and main pipeline 
expansion work occurred in 196 3  and 1968 . However, as of 1974, 75%  of water in 
Guayaquil was provided by private water tankers or community taps (Swyngedouw, 
2004). Following the oil price crash in the early 1980s, the World Bank financed a 
water loan in 1987 . The loan was suspended in 1 9 8 9  due to breach of required 
terms for utility management streamlining and improving operational efficiency. The 
loan was resolved a few years later, as the Ecuadorian Government and Guayaquil 
utility began the steps required by the loan agreement. In 1992 , Ecuador began 
several economic reforms, pushing modernization legislation through its Congress. 
The intent was to modernize infrastructure and open the door to privatization of 
water, electricity and telecommunications. In 199 7  and 1998 , an economic crisis
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resulted, congruent with the Asian and other regional economic crises and El Nino 
impacting Ecuador’s agricultural economy. Oil prices plummeted, the Ecuadorian 
currency (sucre) fell into hyperinflation, unemployment increased, income fell and the  
country defaulted on its foreign debt (Wikipedia, 2 01 2 , citing numerous sources). By 
1999, the banking sector collapsed leading to semi-dollarization and then fully 
replacing Ecuador’s currency with the US dollar. In the process, the government 
bailed out the financial sector. Water privatization was planned for Guayaquil by the 
early 1990s but political instability (6 presidents over 6  years) in the late 199 0s  
delayed public service privatization. As of 1994 , water and sewage utilities were 
merged to create Empresa Cantonal de Aqua Potable y Alcantarillado de Guayaquil 
(ECAPAG). This was seen as positive and necessary given the interconnectedness of 
the provision of potable water and an adequate rainwater drainage system (Joiner,
2007). As of 1995, ECAPAG had already made the decision to contract water and 
sewage services in its master plan for services. The concession bid process was 
guided by a loan agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank, which 
included transitioning ECAPAG to a regulatory body.
After the bid process resulted in potential bidders being disinterested, given 
the aging water, sewage and drainage system, unstable environment and initial 
capital requirements, ECAPAG and Banque Paribas (company advising on the project) 
decided to soften the requirements to generate interest (Joiner, 2007  citing BPD). In 
2001 , Guayaquil’s water and sewage systems were privatized with a concession 
agreement with International Water Services consortium led by Bechtel Corporation. 
The resulting company, Interagua signed a 3 0  year concession agreement. Although, 
the initially intended contract was to include necessary capital investment by the
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company, the resulting contract neither obligated the company to meet specific 
targets, nor to specifically adhere to laws ensuring that services are provided to all 
citizens within the concession area (Joiner, 2007).
In 2005 , Observatorio Ciudadano de Servicios Publicos (OCSP), a local NGO, 
was started to monitor the conduct and compliance of Interagua and ECAPAG. A 
Guayaquil poll of 40 ,0 0 0  inhabitants conducted in the same year showed that people 
felt the need for guaranteeing the rights of all citizens and increased public 
participation, although it is noted that the sample was not representative of the 
whole population (Carrillo et al., 2006). Complaints relating to service quality came 
from poorer areas, such as Guasmo Sur and Suburbio Oeste.
In 2008 , Bechtel sold the majority of its shares in Interagua to Proactive 
Medio Ambiente (Company with Ecuadorian and Colombian parent shareholders).
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARATIVE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
4 .1  Qualitative Approach
In this chapter, a qualitative analysis is conducted across the six water 
privatization cases. Key elements like the nature of the contracts, governance and 
regulatory frameworks, contextual political and economic factors, and privatization 
outcomes are examined. Qualitative information sources include literature sources 
referenced in Chapter Two as well as additional public information. These sources 
include academic articles, government agencies (water utility, regulatory and 
statistical departments), NGO and civil society, and IFI and regional development 
bank sources and reports. Sources not identified as reports specifically primarily 
consist of website resources. Online World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) resources have been accessed as well in reference to sections pertaining to 
these institutions.
In assessing the water privatization cases, two key points must be noted.
First, the six urban water privatization cases have been chosen as prominent 
examples of such cases implemented in the Global South. Second, water 
privatization has been promoted and established based on expected improvements 
over public provision, such as expanding water access and increasing capital 
investment. Consequently, water privatization’s performance is assessed relative to 
prior public provision models and the contractual targets established under 
privatization.
The nature of the privatization contract is critically examined individually and 
then comparatively across cases to identify patterns. The state’s ability to implement 
and enforce agreements with the private sector is contingent on an effective
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governance and regulatory framework. Contracts, governance and outcomes can all 
be affected by political instability, economic conditions and related external agents. 
Accordingly, the chapter is organized around these key qualitative elements for the 
six cases.
It must be emphasized that the qualitative information available for analysis is 
limited by a lack of available direct source information on the contract terms, 
implementation, governance and regulation, contextual factors, contract 
performance and related events. Specific data on Casablanca, as well as La Paz-EI 
Alto and Guayaquil cases have been more difficult to identify and access. There is 
also a general lack of transparency pertaining to the comprehensive conditions of IFI 
loans. Also, access to certain online resources, such as the Indonesian advocacy 
groups People’s Coalition on the Right to Water (KRuHA) and AMRTA Institute for 
water literacy, is sporadic in nature. Consequently, information gaps exist for all of 
the cases to varying degrees.
Table 4 .1  provides a comparative high level summary for the six cases. It can 
be seen that all of the cities, except La Paz-EI Alto (and the country of Bolivia), are 
port cities. Similarly, each of the port cities suffer some level of flooding due to low 
lying areas and/or a lack of appropriate city and sewer drainage systems. Of the port 
cities, only Jakarta’s concession agreement excludes sewerage from the privatization 
scope.
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Table 4 .1  Case Comparison: First Ten to Fifteen Years of Privatization
Category Buenos
Aires
Jakarta Manila Casa. La Paz-EI 
Alto
Guay.
Port city Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Lacking drainage 
infrastructure
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Privatization 
continues today
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Water tariffs 
increase before 
privatization
Yes
Olleta,
2007
Yes
(Not
confirme
d)
Yes
Kumar,
2 00 9
n /a Yes
Laurie &
Crespo,
2007
Yes
Carrillo et 
al., 2 0 0 6
Sector preparation: 
decentralized >= 5 
years before 
privatization
No
Laborde,
2005
Olleta,
2007
Yes
(City
gov.)
Argo &
Laquian,
2007
Yes
Kumar,
2 00 9
No
World
Bank,
2 00 9
n/a Yes
Tiepolo,
2007
Competitive bid 
process (final 
stages)
Yes
Olleta,
2007
No
Bakker 
et al., 
2006
Yes
Negishi,
2 01 0
No
ACME,
2 0 0 8
No
Laurie &
Crespo,
2007
No
Joiner,
2 00 7
Population covered 
by concession
Partial
Metro
Dardenn 
e, 2006
City/
Prov.
Bakker 
et al., 
2006
Metro
MWSS
RO,
2 00 3
Main city
Hatem,
2 00 7
Partial 
Metro 
Laurie & 
Crespo, 
2007  
Darden ne, 
2006
City/
Suburbs
Joiner,
2 00 7
Original network 
expansion targets
Yes
Olleta,
2007
Yes
JWSRB,
2009
Yes
Kumar,
2 0 0 9
Yes
ACME,
2007-
2 0 1 1
Yes
Lobina & 
Hall, 2007
Yes (soft 
terms) 
Joiner, 
2 0 0 7
Informal water 
supplier 
arrangements 
permitted
n/a Yes 
Argo & 
Laquian, 
2007
Yes
ADB,
2 0 0 8
Yes
Company 
ref. to 
subcontra 
ctors
(unconfirm
ed)
n /a Yes
Swyngedou 
w, 2 0 0 4
Investment targets Yes
Olleta,
2007
Yes
JWSRB,
2009
Yes
Kumar,
2 00 9
Yes
Saadi,
2 01 2
No
Laurie &
Crespo,
2007
Yes
Carrillo et 
al., 2 0 0 6
Intended water price 
increases
Yes
Olleta,
2007
Yes
JWSRB,
2009
Yes
ADB,
2 0 0 8
Yes
Olivier,
2 00 9
n /a n/a
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Table 4.1  
(Continued)
h h iiii Buenost,A ire s^ i mu mugM , Guayaquil! {'
Standardized 
subsidy programs
Yes
Dardenn 
e, 2006
No*
Ardhiani 
e &
Zamzami
,2 0 1 0
No* Yes
Olivier,
2 009
Hatem,
2007
No Yes
Carrillo et 
al., 2 0 0 6
Compensation
mode
Revenue
Alcazar
etal.,
2000
Volume 
Argo & 
Laquian, 
2007
Revenue
FDC,
2 0 0 9
Revenue
Saadi,
2012
Revenue 
Morales et 
al., 2006
Revenue
(Unconfirme
d)
Compensation tied 
to US$ or Euro
Yes
FWW,
2009a
Yes
JWSRB,
2009
Yes
FDC,
2 0 0 9
Yes
Hatem,
2007
Yes
Foster & 
Irusta, 2 0 0 3
Yes
(Dollarized)
Tiepolo,
200 7
Contract compliance 
terms noted
Yes
Solanes,
2006
n/a
Kurniasi 
h, 2 00 8
n/a n /a Yes
Laurie &
Crespo,
2007
Yes
Carrillo et 
al., 2 0 0 6
Water governance - 
arm's length?
No
Alcazar
eta l.,
2000
Solanes,
2006
No
Argo &
Laquian,
2007
No
Kumar, 
2 00 9  
Cuaresm 
a, 2 00 6
No
Saadi,
2 01 2
ACME
2007-
2 0 1 1
No
Laurie &
Crespo,
2007
No
Joiner,
2 0 0 7
Water governance - 
decentralized?
Part
Laborde,
2005
Olleta,
2007
Part/lncr
easing?
Nugroho,
2011
No
Kumar,
2 00 9
Part
Saadi,
2 0 1 2
No
Morales et 
al., 2006  
Nickson & 
Vargas, 
2002
Part
Joiner,
2 0 0 7
Negotiating level National
Olleta,
2007
National
JWSRB,
2009
National
Kumar,
2 00 9
National
ACME,
2 0 0 8
National 
Laurie & 
Crespo, 
2007
National
Joiner,
2 0 0 7
Water governance 
levels
Multiple
Olleta,
2007
Multiple
Nugroho,
2 011
JWSRB,
2009
Multiple
FDC,
2 0 0 5
Multiple
Saadi,
2 0 1 2
Lahlou,
2 0 0 8
National 
Laurie & 
Crespo, 
2007
Multiple
Joiner,
2 0 0 7
Contract /  service 
regulator
Dedicate
d
Olleta,
2007
Not
specified
initially
JWSRB,
2009
Dedicate
d
FDC,
2 0 0 5
Committe
e
ACME,
2 0 0 7
Water dep’t 
regulates 
Laurie & 
Crespo, 
2007
Dedicated 
Carrillo et 
al., 2 0 0 6
Water governance - 
legislated regulator?
Yes
Solanes,
2 00 6
No
Bakker 
et al., 
2008
No
Kumar,
2 0 0 9
n /a Yes
(Implied) 
Morales et 
al., 2006
Yes
Joiner,
2 00 7
*  Supplemental subsidy programs have not been noted as vital to the concession agreement. 
Note, n /a denotes not available or applicable.
The sections that follow provide a detailed qualitative examination of the key 
elements or parameters of the cases.
4 .2  Nature of Contracts
This section compares the water concession contracts across the six cases, 
identifying and describing trends and noting specific terms. The cases are compared 
over a period of observation of approximately eight to 13 years depending on the 
case. Most of the analysis in this section pertains to the immediate lead up to and 
terms of the contracts upon privatization except where explicitly noted.
Pre-Contract Situation
As alluded to and mentioned in the earlier chapters, the World Bank has 
played a leading advocacy, promotional and technical support role in facilitating at 
least five of the water privatizations.27 These roles generally reflect loan 
conditionalities which are generally determined in the World Bank’s practices, rather 
than being explicitly stated in project loan agreements. The World Bank’s 
involvement in these cases has included: loan financing for water and sewerage 
system infrastructure leading up to the water privatizations; technical and advisory 
support for liberalization, decentralization and privatization policy reforms; technical 
studies (i.e. pertaining to operating and infrastructure deficiencies); and institutional 
restructuring preparation and implementation necessary for privatization.
27 The World Bank’s water concession bid process role was not confirmed in Casablanca's case.
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Water tariffs increased within two years prior to water privatization in five of 
the cases.28 Such price alleviation appears to have been instrumental for promoting 
and facilitating public acceptance of privatization.
Privatization Support Financing
Numerous types and levels (i.e. national to local) of financing facilitated policy 
and water-specific reforms and improvements leading up to privatization. Funding 
continued during the privatizations, to serve additional reform supports, water 
resource management, infrastructure, and social programs (e.g. subsidizing water 
connection charges). Both before and during the privatizations financing has come 
from the World Bank, IMF, regional development banks, additional foreign and 
domestic commercial lending institutions, and in at least one case - state funding (tax 
subsidy provided to support capital works in Guayaquil). Casablanca is the only water 
case to not involve World Bank financing support during the immediate lead up to 
and initial years of the privatization.
Concession Process
Buenos Aires and Manila solicited multiple contract bidders in the final stages 
of their concession bid processes. The other four cases either lacked competitive 
concession processes or resulted in single bids. Jakarta and Casablanca concession 
contracts were directly awarded. La Paz-EI Alto and Guayaquil water privatization 
offers encountered difficulties in eliciting bids, eventually resulting in single qualifying 
bids that led to the concession agreements. These two concessions were designed 
to solicit bids based on the number of new water connections to be installed and the 
resulting network coverage. For Buenos Aires, Manila, as well as Jakarta, the primary
28 No reference to pre-privatization rates was found for Casablanca.
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contract bid criterion was lowest water price (although Jakarta directly negotiated its 
terms with pre-selected companies).
It is apparent in these cases that concession bid processes being based on 
lowest water price has contributed to competition for the contracts. Conversely, bid 
criteria with a greater focus on explicit or implied capital investment requirements 
appear to have detracted from contract competition in the other three applicable 
cases.
Contract Terms, Geography and Scope
International consortiums, comprised of multinational corporations, 
contracted for the water concessions in all cases. Due to legislative limitations, 
Jakarta and Manila concessions were initially arranged to include domestic company 
majority ownership, although the foreign consortiums have managed operations over 
the duration of privatization. Five of the six cases initially involved Suez S.A.29 as a 
lead partner. All six cases (eight contracts, as Jakarta and Manila both comprised 
two concession areas each) were developed and implemented as water monopolies 
with 25  to 3 0  year terms. All of the concessions, by definition, are comprehensive 
water distribution system leases30, negotiated to include operations, maintenance, 
administration and capital planning and investment responsibilities.
29 As indicated previously, this multinational corporation’s involvement was as Lyonnaise des Eaux in a 
few cases, later merging to create Suez S.A., and more recently splitting into GDF Suez and Suez 
Environnement.
30 In five of the cases, concessions have included varying levels of sewerage system responsibilities 
such as network and/or septic tank household sewer connections and wastewater treatm ent plant 
construction and operations. All of the cities have drainage systems which include some level of raw 
untreated sewage running through drainage systems and open canals.
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In all cases, the longterm leases have been owned by private sector 
consortiums.31 The concession area water networks, to have been expanded, cover 
the respective urban areas to varying insufficient degrees. Each of the cities has 
experienced significant deficiencies in network coverage where many of the 
peripheral urban areas are generally represented by slums. The negotiated 
concession area boundaries have been noted as missing significant peripheral 
populations in some of the cases. For example, as highlighted in Chapter Two, 
Buenos Aires and La Paz-EI Alto concession boundaries have missed significant 
populations (15% or more) from network expansion plans (Dardenne, 2 0 0 6 ). This 
issue has also been noted in Casablanca’s case, particularly in reference to a lack of 
property rights inhibiting inclusion in the water concession. In Jakarta and M anila’s 
cases, peripheral areas fall into other municipalities’ authority. The case cities have 
all had urban slums comprising between approximately one- and two-thirds of urban 
populations at the privatizations’ inceptions.32 Overall, the initial observation with 
respect to geographic scope is that such significant particularly peri-urban 
populations were very likely not adequately addressed when originally establishing 
the contract parties’ obligations.
Performance Targets33
All of the agreements include targets for increased water service expansion 
over the full term of the concession. The concessions agreements also generally
31 Of course, this does not preclude public institutional investors from being shareholders in the 
individual companies or transferred water utility companies (as applicable).
32 Refer to Table 5.1. This data is used as a general reference only, as some figures do not appear 
representative of the case cities and/or rapidly declining trends appear contrary to other qualitative 
source reports.
33 Note that sewerage, wastewater treatment related targets are not directly assessed within the 
comparative analysis except where exceptional notice is made.
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have or require specific shorter term (i.e. five and/or ten year) performance targets. 
The criteria for service expansion have included geographic and population coverage 
of the respective water and sewerage networks. In most cases, water and sewerage 
connection objectives are separately articulated. The degree to which contract terms 
have clearly specified network expansion terms is unknown. As indicated in earlier 
chapters, contract renegotiations reduced or removed specific expansion targets in 
the cases of Buenos Aires, Jakarta and Manila. In the other three cases, network 
expansion is based on either a calculated proportion of geographic network 
coverage, numbers of household connections, or specific populations requiring water 
service access.
In at least three cases, Jakarta, Manila, and La Paz-EI Alto, performance 
targets are explicitly identified as intending to achieve universal (100% ) water 
coverage: Manila -  after 10 years, Jakarta -  after 25  years, and La Paz-EI Alto -  after 
five years, as per original contractual terms. Jakarta and Manila contracts do not 
clearly mandate household connections as the primary mode of domestic water 
access (i.e. permitting public taps to meet coverage targets). Moreover, in these two 
case agreements as well as those of Casablanca and Guayaquil, informal third party 
water providers are either allowed or not explicitly banned within the concession 
service areas.34 These contractual terms, or lack thereof, have significant bearing on 
the nature and geography of water access. Moreover, these circumstances also have 
implications for whether water concession terms are being adequately fulfilled as 
intended. Only La Paz-EI Alto appears to have explicit household network connection
34 No information found on Buenos Aires or La Paz /  El Alto.
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targets mandated by the contract, which were intended to specifically target 
increased services for un-served poor households in El Alto.
In at least half of the cases, Manila, Jakarta, and Casablanca, concessions 
have included provisions to reduce water losses (also referred to as non-revenue or 
unaccounted-for water). In two of these cases, Manila and Jakarta, as well as 
Guayaquil, terms were also included to address water pressure where it has been 
identified as an issue for water service continuity and quality. Water quality is noted 
as a key target in two of these cases: Manila and Guayaquil. Sewerage connection 
targets are separately defined to varying degrees for the five applicable cases 
(excludes Jakarta).
Investment Targets
Five of the six concession agreements have clear investment targets for the 
companies. However, La Paz-EI Alto’s contract specified water connection targets 
without corresponding investment levels. Manila’s contracts have included terms 
requiring concessionaires to repay prior debts held by the public water company. 
Contract renegotiations for Buenos Aires, Jakarta and Manila have resulted in 
reduced investment commitments.
Casablanca’s case is the only example of domestic currency also being used 
for capital works financing initially, without any noted indexing to a foreign currency. 
Jakarta and Manila are also noted as raising funds in local investment markets within 
the first ten years.
Water Pricing Terms
Manila is the only concession noted as including an original target for ongoing 
water price reductions. Such changes are managed by the “rebasing” exercise
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discussed by Kumar (2009) in Chapter Two. This is also one of the three cities which 
included price as the primary bid criterion. It appears that all cases have a form of 
increasing block water tariff (i.e. escalating price per volume), with different 
categories of residential and commercial customers paying differing water rates. Five 
of the six cases have involved charges to customers for new water connections 
regardless of residential customer class. Only Guayaquil has categorically waived 
charges for new connections (tied to a state subsidy). In two other cases,
Casablanca and Buenos Aires, social water tariff programs have been implemented 
to subsidize the first block of water consumption for eligible households. On this 
point though, program eligibility may not have been adequately addressed within the  
contracts. This point was alluded to earlier in Chapter Three by Saadi (2 0 1 2 ) and 
Dardenne, 2006 , with respect to these respective cases. At least four of the cases, 
Buenos Aires, Jakarta, Manila, and Casablanca, have included contract terms for 
periodic water rate increases or reviews. Water pricing is a term regulated by the 
contract and government agencies authorized to review and approve water price 
decisions. Each concession varies with respect to the level of reference to and 
resulting implementation of procedures and regulatory processes for water tariffs.
In three of the renegotiated cases (excluding Casablanca), the new terms 
have allowed for new and ongoing water price increases (particularly for Jakarta and 
Buenos Aires). Price increases have been facilitated by negotiating higher 
guaranteed rates of return.
Contract terms do not appear to include obligations that address or regulate 
pricing for third party (i.e. re-sellers) water markets. In at least three cases, Jakarta, 
Manila and Guayaquil, vendor water accessed through reselling and other sources
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was a significant residential water provision mechanism at the outset of privatization. 
These secondary markets charge higher rates per volume but do not require any 
network connection infrastructure. Also, in Casablanca’s case, subcontractors have 
been mentioned as providing services although little is known about pre-privatization 
water vendor markets.
Compensation Terms
In five of the six cases (excludes Guayaquil), service compensation has been 
fixed to specific foreign exchange rates, and foreign capital controls have been 
relaxed effectively transferring financial risk to government authorities and 
consumers (subject to pricing regulation). Four of these cases have involved contract 
renegotiations to further affect these terms (excluding La Paz-EI Alto). Ecuador 
moved to using the US dollar as its domestic currency prior to Guayaquil’s concession 
agreement implementation.
Jakarta’s concession agreement is the only example of company revenues 
being based on water volume sold rather than sales revenues. This contract term  
was emphasized by Argo and Laquian (2007 ) in Chapter Two. In this case, there has 
not been an apparent control mechanism to ensure that appropriate levels of capital 
investment and corresponding network expansion at least partly define the method 
of sale. Consequently, this puts an inordinate amount of pressure on the water 
authority to increase prices to transfer risks to customers.
All of the concession agreements include provisions for guaranteed or 
expected levels of company return.
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Compliance Terms
Buenos Aires, La Paz-EI Alto, and Guayaquil are identified as having (or having 
had) defined sanctions for contractual non-compliance. La Paz-EI Alto’s penalty 
terms were clearly defined while the other two cases have been noted but not 
confirmed. No such terms are initially apparent in the other three cases. The 
contract renegotiations that took place have essentially acted to relax or remove 
compliance terms.35 Collectively, the renegotiations were made in several iterations 
over a number of years. Overall, only one of six cases, La Paz-EI Alto, is known to 
have explicitly articulated contract sanctions which are directly linked to 
underperformance of water and sewerage connection installation targets.
Contract Terminations, Disputes & Ownership Transfers
Buenos Aires and La Paz-EI Alto contracts were eventually terminated. In both 
cases, terminations appear to have been instigated by the state. Although in Buenos 
Aires’ case, the dispute over the government freezing water prices and reversal of 
exchange rate protections left the company in a situation that could not be mutually 
resolved. Both cases have involved some level of legal threat and continuation to the  
World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
Jakarta and Manila have both had various court and arbitration panel disputes 
leading to and subsequent to renegotiations.
Concession ownership changes have been permitted in all six cases during 
the first ten years of privatization. In three cases (all five companies), Manila, Jakarta 
and Guayaquil, majority company shareholders have changed. In the cases of 
Buenos Aires, La Paz-EI Alto and Manila (East), the World Bank became part
35 It is not known whether these changes were formalized or simply allowed by regulating authorities.
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concession owner. In East Manila, Manila Water’s major shareholder Ayala Group is 
a multinational investment group with local colonial history. Manila W ater has now 
recently become the major shareholder in West Jakarta’s water concession company. 
All other majority concession shareholders are also multinational corporations. 
Jakarta’s only domestic tie, Astra International, is a company originating in Indonesia 
but now subsidiary to foreign holdings company Jardine Matheson (Hall and Lobina, 
2009). Overall, it appears that there are few, if any, capital control barriers to 
transferring majority ownership /  operator. Also, as relating to investments 
mentioned above, there is no consistent method of capital financing with private and 
publicly-traded companies obtaining capital financing from and distributing dividends 
to various sources. Government oversight of such transfers has been noted in two 
cases (Guayaquil and West Manila).
4 .3  Governance and Regulation
This section focuses on governance and regulation, comparing reformed 
water governance institutional roles and levels of responsibility to identify trends and 
differences as relevant to the privatization outcomes across the cases. The objective 
is to capture any trends in legislation, procedures, governance structures and 
respective roles in governing the contracts and regulating the related services. 
Regulation is primarily examined through the established regulatory bodies 
responsible for water service regulation in the respective cities. Therefore, 
environmental and public health regulations are only examined in so far as these 
mechanisms are known to be integrated with reformed urban water service 
regulation.
68
Pre-Concession Reforms
In the years leading up to and continuing during the concessions, all cases 
have involved policy reforms and government restructuring to facilitate water 
privatization. Policy reforms have included liberalization36, decentralization, and 
privatization reforms to accommodate water privatization. In three of the cases, 
Indonesia, Philippines and Ecuador, water and sanitation sector decentralization (to 
regionalize water management) began at least five years prior to the water 
privatizations. In Argentina and Bolivia, reforms were part of broad privatization 
initiatives across several sectors that were implemented in only three to four years. 
Bolivia is the only country which has been noted to include fiscal decentralization, 
although water sector decentralization for the La Paz-EI Alto privatization is not 
apparent. Water decentralization began in Morocco just two years prior to 
Casablanca’s privatization.
As mentioned earlier, in five of the six cases, the World Bank provided funding 
predicated on national and regional level policy reforms to facilitate decentralization, 
liberalization and privatization.37 The Bank provided direct assistance or supervision 
in the designs and implementations of policy reforms and the subsequent and 
concurrent water concession processes.
In the case of Jakarta, a water law required by the World Bank took six years 
to implement. Legislative changes accommodating water privatization have 
prioritized recognition of water’s multiple purposes and types of users. This may 
potentially contradict pre-existing constitutional definitions of water access.
36 Liberalization, in this context refers to policy changes that permit foreign investment and operation 
of a utility, and relax restrictions on their activities.
37 For Morocco, the World Bank’s first loan following the immediate lead up to Casablanca’s water 
privatization occurred ten years after the privatization.
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Governance Model, Contract Regulation and the Regulator
As noted in Table 4.1, all of the concessions were negotiated by national-level 
authorities. Five of the six governance models were developed with multiple levels of 
government involvement -  national level ministries holding specific contract and 
environmental mandates; multi-level board representation for regulating authorities; 
and/or high-level officials appointing respective directors. La Paz-EI Alto’s water 
privatization was highly centralized, stemming from reforms, restructuring and 
implementation at the national level, with no resulting authority at the local level. 
Ecuador’s model is also highly centralized as the concession agreement for 
Guayaquil was arranged by the President’s office and signed at the Inter-American 
Development Bank’s (lADB’s) Washington (DC) offices. Guayaquil’s mayor is the only 
local representative on the water regulator’s board. However, irregularities have 
been noted, such as the National Comptroller’s Office not being used for financial 
oversight of the water concession. Manila’s water governance is also centralized as 
the president appoints the water authority board members. Buenos Aires’ 
governance model included the national government overseeing the concession with 
all three levels of government represented on the regulator’s board. Casablanca’s 
governance model includes national oversight with municipal representation. Finally, 
Jakarta’s water governance model has the city’s water authority reporting to the local 
government (governor and local assembly).38
Three water governance models, Buenos Aires, Manila, and Guayaquil began 
with a city-specific water regulatory body. As alluded to in Chapter Two, Casablanca’s 
regulator is noted as being structured as a committee rather than a dedicated
38 The water concession agreement is for DKI Jakarta, which is formally a province.
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department. Jakarta’s governance model initially included only the water authority 
(without dedicated regulatory duties), creating a regulatory office for monitoring 
purposes only after renegotiating contracts three years later. Lastly, Bolivia’s 
national water authority also acted as regulator for the La Paz-EI Alto water 
concession.
In all cases, the regulatory body does not appear, by design, a t arm ’s length 
from the government, which has promoted varying levels of political influence or 
interference. Only Jakarta appears to have this influence isolated to the local 
authority (Only after presidency changed shortly after privatization) while all other 
cases have national level departments or presidential office representation that have 
been in a position to supersede local authority to regulate the water contracts and 
services. All cases call into question the regulator’s mandate and authority to 
regulate network expansion, quality and/or water pricing. In some cases, these 
duties are split between more than one department39, or roles are conflicting, or can 
be superseded by national offices.
In half of the cases, Buenos Aires, Jakarta and La Paz-EI Alto, government 
bodies have been identified as having authority to exercise contract sanction 
measures. La Paz-EI Alto’s water concession is the only case with clearly defined and 
communicated fines for non-compliance, although it is also the only case with no 
local level regulatory authority. None of the cases have been identified as including 
regulation over subcontracted or vendor water supply and services.
39 Generally, governments are noted as having separate ministries responsible for the contracts, 
environmental and public health.
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4 .4  Contextual Factors
This section comprises external factors closely relating to and affecting the 
water contracts and respective governance models. Contextual comparative analysis 
includes an assessment of external entities, political and economic factors impacting 
or supplementing water privatization contracts, services and governance models. 
Pre-Privatization Facilitation
The IMF and World Bank have had a history of extending loans beginning 
before the 1990s in all six cases. The two institutions generally work together with 
the World Bank providing sectoral reforms and project loans, while the IMF focuses 
on fiscal stabilization and monetary policy efforts. This appears indicative of the lead 
up to these cases, as previously described, with a significant role for the World Bank 
in five of the six cases40 in national liberalization and specific privatization reforms, 
particularly of public utilities and in water resource management. Such reforms and 
related loans are generally justified by the increasing urban pressure on water 
resources, public utilities and their scope and quality of services in all six cases. The 
five of six cases involving significant World Bank involvement also have been viewed 
as fiscal crises at national and/or local levels preceding the water privatization 
reforms. Water privatization is a loan assistance condition in at least four of the  
cases 41
Regional development banks have also provided varying levels of assistance 
to the water concession processes, although there is no specific identifiable trend 
across cases. The World Bank has provided significant direct facilitation in five
40 In Casablanca’s case, no direct involvement by the World Bank has been confirmed relating to the 
concession process specifically.
41 Unconfirmed for Indonesia and Morocco.
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cases’ concession bid and contracting processes. This role has encompassed 
designing and facilitating the concession bid process (which have included bid 
criteria and a pre-qualification process), the contract model, concession promotion, 
and implementation until the signing of the agreements. Technical studies are also 
confirmed to have preceded some concession processes with the World Bank 
funding and/or subcontracting consultants to undertake these studies.
The Role of Economic Crises
The IMF financed national loan packages for Argentina, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Bolivia, and Ecuador either just prior to and/or during the water 
privatizations. Loans were also provided to Morocco although this was more than a 
decade prior to the water privatization in Casablanca. The primary five bailouts all 
included significant currency devaluations which sparked debt repayment issues. In 
Argentina’s case, the IMF was directly involved in calling for relaxation of currency 
controls preceding a devaluation that prompted rescue loans. Only Morocco has 
maintained currency exchange rate controls during the water privatization.42 
Political Instability & Influence
All of the case countries can be viewed as politically unstable to varying 
degrees. Indonesia was considered highly corrupt in the 1990s due to the 
centralized military-led government. Immediate economic circumstances contributed 
to President Suharto’s exit, supplemented with a bailout by the IMF. Perceptions of 
corruption have only marginally changed though 43 Bolivia experienced frequent 
turnover of its presidency leading up to water privatization. Ecuador is viewed as
42 Various supplemental documents have been accessed for this section at www.imf.org
43 In fact, perceptions of corruption have worsened (i.e. 1999  to 2007, according to Transparency 
International, 2012).
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increasingly corrupt. These factors have contributed to a lack of competition for each 
of the water concessions during the bidding processes. Moreover, in reference to the  
renegotiations which were experienced in the other three cases (as well as for 
Jakarta), no formal governance mechanism was apparent in allowing for the 
contracts to be reopened. Buenos Aires’ regulator was moved to the environmental 
ministry to remove it from contract renegotiations. As mentioned in Chapter Two 
(FDC, 2005), Manila’s regulator has an informal relationship with and physical 
proximity to the water concessionaire. Guayaquil’s contract cannot be effectively 
regulated due to performance targets not being requirements of the contract.
4 .5  Privatization Outcomes 
Contract Performance
Based on the original contracts, all companies have failed to achieve their 
respective water network expansion targets in the first ten years of privatized 
operations. In five of these cases, based on original terms, the lack of expansion 
targets has essentially constituted a breach of contract. In the sixth case,
Guayaquil’s targets are not stipulated as required by the contract.
As previously indicated, five of the six cases’ concession agreements44 include 
corresponding investment targets, while La Paz only specified connection installation 
targets without corresponding investment level required. Guayaquil’s concession 
only included a soft target for investment levels for the first ten year plan which has 
not formally carried into subsequent plans. In the other four concession models, the 
companies have under-invested relative to original contract terms. However, contract
44 Referring to Jakarta and Manila as one case each given that the contract model is the same for both 
concession areas in each respective city.
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renegotiations for Buenos Aires, Jakarta and Manila reduced respective contractual 
water coverage targets.45 These renegotiations resulted in a lack of clarity in revised 
targets and related terms, which have made it difficult to assess whether subsequent 
terms and performance have been adequate.
Both Manila and Jakarta have not reached original non-revenue water targets 
established to reduce water leakages. It has been suggested that such losses 
represent increased theft of water. Manila and Jakarta have used bulk water sales at 
the water network’s periphery towards achieving water coverage targets. As 
indicated earlier, it is not clear whether contract terms formally allow such informal 
network extension. Moreover, increased water prices from informal water sales 
amongst predominantly poor populations will likely lead to increased theft of water, 
particularly given that alternative water sources are not formally permitted.46 Overall, 
four of the six cases are noted as continuing subcontracting and/or informal vendor 
water arrangements to service areas within the concession area scope that are not 
serviced by network infrastructure.47
Contractual performance failures have consistently occurred from the outset 
for all contracts. Subsequent contract renegotiations have acted as a performance 
disincentive given that water coverage and necessary capital investment targets were 
reduced.
In four cases, Buenos Aires, Jakarta, La Paz-EI Alto, and Guayaquil, elevated 
prevalence of water-borne diseases have been noted. Specific water and sewerage 
infrastructure issues have been noted as public health hazards in three of these
45 Including sewerage targets for Buenos Aires and Manila.
46 Casablanca has also been noted as permitting subcontracting of services although no data was 
found. Refer to Table 5 .1  for slum population information.
47 No information found on Buenos Aires or La P a z / El Alto.
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cases, Buenos Aires, Jakarta, and Guayaquil; as well as Manila. There is no 
identifiable trend across cases to date to reasonably assess whether water 
privatization has improved water quality though.
Water Tariffs and Access for the Poor
As noted in Chapter Two by several authors, in five of the six cases (all except 
Casablanca), nominal water tariff increases have been at least implied as prohibitive 
for customers at particular times during the privatizations (See Table 4 .2). The cases 
initially had varying levels of water price regulation. After renegotiations took place 
for some of the cases, further water price changes were permitted. In three cases, 
Buenos Aires, Jakarta, and Manila, water pricing has been found to be prohibitive to 
users in general. In cases where alternative sources are available (Jakarta, Manila, 
Guayaquil), vendor water has been accessed at much higher prices, or, when water 
cannot be afforded, water is accessed without an official connection or sources are 
contaminated.
La Paz-EI Alto is the only case known to have effectively required water 
coverage to poor areas, despite un-served areas comprising significant proportions of 
poor neighbourhoods. The World Bank has been noted as funding water subsidy 
programs focused on the urban poor at different times during privatization in all of 
the cases. However, none of these programs have been identified as sufficient to 
substantially support the companies in meeting their contracted service coverage or 
corresponding investment targets. The Casablanca program appears to involve 
substantial numbers of poor households, although as previously noted, water 
connection installation figures presented by the company have been questioned in 
general.
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It appears that the initial concession bid processes including low-price criteria 
put immediate subsequent upward pressure on prices in the cases of Buenos Aires, 
Jakarta and Manila which also contributed to the renegotiation of contracts. In two of 
these cases, Jakarta and Manila, as well as Guayaquil, water vendors have continued 
to serve poor areas with bulk water access informally extending networks, charging 
prohibitive pricing. No known regulatory mechanisms have been identified for vendor 
water in these cases. At the same time, the concession companies have reported 
water coverage increases that imply network expansions through bulk water sales.
4 .6  Qualitative Summary
The qualitative analysis of the six cases in this chapter has revealed the 
general failure of water privatization. The failures pertain to various overlapping 
aspects of water privatization including: (1) inadequate contracts with ambiguous 
terms, (2) lack of effective governance and regulatory oversight, (3) political 
interference, corruption and lack of accountability, (4) preference of international 
interests over domestic public interest48, and (5) unfavourable economic situations 
and political instability-that have exacerbated the problems with such concessions. 
Table 4 .2  shows a summary of these and various additional findings.
A key comment regarding these findings is that privatization has been more 
highly analyzed and publicized than the previous public water model. As a result, the 
concession agreement obligations and promises to improve upon previous service 
metrics have acted as a proxy for privatization’s success.
48 Although use of domestic financing sources to some degree in three known cases, Jakarta, Manila 
and Casablanca, may be viewed as serving a domestic interest.
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From this critical context, the qualitative analysis generally shows privatization 
to be a failure thus far. However, Casablanca’s recent renegotiation of the water 
concession shows signs of potentially remedying performance deficiencies apparent 
during the first ten years of this concession by limiting the company’s rate of return 
and restoring investment shortcomings. Furthermore, it has been reported very 
recently that fines have been levied for under-performance, although the company 
has publicly disputed these findings. This case is the only partial exception to the 
generalized findings.
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Table 4 .2  Summary of Privatization Concessions Structure and Performance
Category Buenos Aires Jakarta Manila Casa. La Paz
/ E l
Alto
Guay.
World /  Regional 
Development Bank 
Facilitation
Yes
Olleta, 2007  
FWW, 2009a
Yes 
Argo & 
Laquian, 
2007
Yes 
Argo & 
Laquian, 
2007
n/a Yes 
Morale 
s et al, 
2 0 0 6
Yes
Swynge
douw,
2 0 0 4
Majority Ownership Change? n/a Yes 
Hall & 
Lobina, 
2009
Yes
FDC,
2009
No n /a Yes
IF A /
MIGA,
2 0 0 8
Original contract expansion 
targets met?
No
Castro & 
Azpiazu, 
2012
No
Ardhiani 
e &
Zamzami
,2 0 1 0
JWSRB,
2009
No
Public
Citizen,
2003
No
Saadi,
2012
ACME
2007-
2011
No
Laurie
&
Crespo 
, 2 0 0 7
n /a  
Joiner, 
2 0 0 7  
Cardena 
s, 2 0 0 8
Original contract investment 
targets met?
No
Castro & 
Azpiazu,
2012
Lobina & Hall, 
2007
Olleta, 2007
No
(Implied)
JWSRB,
2009
No
FDC,
2009
No
ACME,
2007-
2011
Saadi,
2012
n /a  
Lobina 
& Hall, 
2 00 7  
FWW, 
2 0 0 6
n /a
Contract renegotiated? Yes
Alcazar et al., 
2 00 0
Olleta, 2007
Yes 
Hall et 
al., 2010
Yes
FDC,
2005,
2009
Yes
Saadi,
2012
No No
Excessive foreign currency 
expenditures?
Yes
Laborde,
200 5
Yes 
Argo & 
Laquian, 
2007
Y e s / 
n/a  
Argo & 
Laquian, 
2007
Yes
Lahlou,
2008
ACME,
2007-
2011
n /a n /a
Excessive company debt? Yes
Laborde,
2005  
Solanes,
2006
n/a Y e s / 
n/a  
Chia et 
al., 2007
n/a n /a n /a
79
Table 4 .2  (Continued)
Category Buenos Aires Jakarta Manila Casa. La Paz
/ E l
Alto
Guay.
Vendor /  subcontractor water 
continues?
n/a Yes 
Argo & 
Laquian, 
2007
Yes
ADB,
2008
Yes
Hatem,
2007
(‘Subco
ntracto
rs’,
unconfi
rmed)
n/a Yes
Joiner,
2 0 0 7
Significant water price 
increases?
Yes
Olleta, 2007  
Castro & 
Azpiazu, 
2012
Yes 
Argo & 
Laquian, 
2007
Yes
Argo &
Laquian,
2007
FDC,
2005
Yes
Saadi,
2012
Yes
Laurie
&
Crespo
,2 0 0 7
n /a
Cardena 
s, 2 0 0 8
Disputes and public protest? Yes
ICSID, 2010
Yes 
Argo & 
Laquian, 
2007  
Bakker 
et al.,
Yes
Argo &
Laquian,
2007
MWSS
RO,
2003
Yes
Olivier,
2009
ACME,
2012
Yes
Darden 
ne, 
2 0 0 6  
Morale 
s et al., 
2 0 0 6
Yes
IFC/MIG  
A, 2 0 0 8
Economic or financial crisis 
followed by additional IFI 
loans?
Yes
Solanes,
2006
Yes 
Argo & 
Laquian, 
2007
Yes, Argo 
&
Laquian,
2007
No Y e s /
n/a
Morale 
s et al., 
2 0 0 6
Y e s /
n /a
Tiepolo,
200 7
Effective concession process 
and contract design?
No
Solanes,
2006
No
Argo &
Laquian,
2007
No
FDC,
2009
n/a No
Laurie
&
Crespo 
, 2 00 7
No
Joiner,
2 0 0 7
Evidence of regulatory 
enforcement?
No
Porporato & 
Robbins, 
2010
No
Argo &
Laquian,
2007
No
ADB,
2008
Yes*
Saadi,
2012
No
(after 
term ’n) 
Lobina 
& Hall, 
200 7
Y e s **
FWW.
2 0 0 7
Water quality or sewerage 
health hazards?
Yes
Alcazar et al., 
2000
Engel et al., 
2011
Yes
Kurniasi 
h, 2 0 0 8
Yes
Argo &
Laquian,
2007
MWSS
RO,
2003
n/a Yes
FWW,
2 0 0 6
Yes
Tiepolo,
2 0 0 7
Note, n /a denotes not available or applicable. Split answer indicates differing observations for each 
concession area or differing answers for each part of the respective category.
*  15 years into privatization, relating to first ten year performance.
* *  Performance fine has been noted as of 2006. Details unknown.
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Active Concessions
Although the four active privatization cases, Jakarta, Manila, Casablanca, and 
Guayaquil still have many years remaining in their contracts, it appears that the 
revised contracts and existing governance frameworks constrain potential future 
successes for Jakarta, Manila and Guayaquil. This point is demonstrated by various 
summary points presented in Table 4.2. For example, these three active concessions 
have all changed majority shareholder operators within ten years of privatization. 
These concessions all permit vendor supply arrangements which are not regulated 
under the concessions, yet are used to account for company water coverage target 
successes (which are supposed to be regulated?). Additionally, the World Bank 
concession process and agreement design, and contract renegotiation of price 
controls and alleviation of performance targets; appear to have solely favoured the 
companies. These findings point to a critical lack of service criteria and 
accountability in the concession models. It appears that the renegotiations for 
Jakarta and Manila were approved to appease the companies. As alluded to earlier, 
Jakarta’s government’s weak contract position led to further alleviation of company 
responsibilities in the 2 0 0 1  renegotiations. Manila’s renegotiation effectively 
weakened contractual requirements. The concession terms for Guayaquil alleviated 
much of the accountability for the company by not mandating coverage targets. Such 
evidence suggests that any future changes to remedy contractual shortcomings in 
any of these cases to favour of the states and/or general public would be difficult to 
renegotiate without violating the terms of the existing contracts.
These factors have constrained state autonomy and capacity to favourably 
resolve water service needs to benefit the general public and slow or stop related
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capital outflows. As noted, of the four remaining cases, only Casablanca has shown 
potential signs of regulating the company to provide effective service within a limited 
rate of return in the future, although the company has not yet acknowledged its 
shortcomings to the degree of complying with contract sanctions.
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CHAPTER FIVE: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
This chapter examines quantitative data on water connections and coverage, 
consumption and pricing across the cases before and after privatization to the extent 
possible given the available data. Given severe data limitations and reliability, the 
examination falls short of a proper quantitative analysis. As a result, this partial 
analysis is only meant to supplement the qualitative analysis in the previous chapter.
5 .1  Data Sources and Definitions
In addition to various case reports, a few major sources for quantitative data 
across the cases are used in this chapter. The latter include Marin (2009 ), the  
International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities database  
(IBNET, 2005-2011), and UN-HABITAT (2008 ) and United Nations (UN) Statistics 
Division (2012) information. UN-HABITAT's State of the World's Cities 2 0 1 0 /2 0 1 1
(2008) is used for comparative city populations and slum populations. UN Statistics 
Division (2012) is used for some population information. As concession area 
population estimates differ by source, and in some cases do not align with the city or 
metropolitan area boundaries, water supply coverage and populations served data 
are also used to cross reference and establish reasonable estimations for population 
figures during the relevant years of analysis.
Population figures are estimates of the populations of the water concession 
areas. Where noted, population figures may be re-estimated to capture populations 
thought to be missed by registered population figures.
Number o f Water Network Connections figures represent the number of water 
connections known for individual years for the respective water case cities. The
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number of water connections from one year to the next provides an annualized 
measure of performance without taking population into account. Disaggregated 
residential connections are provided and analyzed only where noted.
Population Served figures are estimated figures for populations served by the 
existing water connections for each case city by year. Population served acts as a 
flow through figure for calculating water supply coverage.
Water Coverage figures represent the percentage of total population estimated to 
be served by the existing water connections (Population served divided by total 
population in the respective concession area) for each year.
Water Consumption is the volume of water sold, expressed in millions of cubic 
metres per year. The figures are converted into water consumption per capita as a 
proxy for household consumption, which is generally a larger proportion of total water 
consumption compared to commercial and industrial users of potable water 
resources.
Average Water Price is generally expressed as the average price paid for access 
to each cubic metre, or other specified measure, of potable water.
5.2 Data Limitations and Qualifications
Several constraints emerged while attempting to obtain water coverage 
(and/or network connections, population and household size data as applicable), 
consumption and pricing data over time and across cases: (1) Full data sets for 
comparison are not available, (2) Methods of determining these variables differ by 
location and source, (3) Many officially-recognized figures appear void of scrutiny and 
simply align with contractual targets, (4) Most figures do not distinguish between
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residential, commercial and institutional data figures49, and (5) Very few figures were 
identified for years before water privatization. This limitation is especially apparent 
with respect to water consumption (Section 5.5). As a result, as indicated above, the 
method has involved close scrutiny of source data to attempt to use the most 
reasonable data in each case.
Official population estimates from national censuses and the UN tend to 
underestimate metropolitan figures quoted by various literature sources. Such 
higher estimates are based on geographic and social realities in these cities. Urban 
peripheries mostly comprise poor populations in each of these cities. They are 
significant in proportions, lack property rights and the ability and rights to be counted 
officially. As a consequence, they also get left out of the services and figures quoted 
to determine the water concession city and population-served contract parameters. 
Across all cases, urbanization trends are simply contradicted by outdated census 
information. There is a need to acknowledge and recognize the real populations that 
make up the significant informal settlements and areas generally described as 
slums. See Table 5.1 for the estimated proportion of urban slums in case countries.
A significant limitation in acquiring meaningful data relates to the complexities 
of the respective water rate (tariff) structures. Average water pricing and 
consumption is not consistently disaggregated to residential levels. Water block tariff 
structures generally charge different rates to specific categories of residential, 
commercial and institutional customers, as well as varying levels within residential 
categories. Consequently, in some cases, the data is not available or only available
49 Companies approached directly indicated that such disaggregation was not available.
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from limited sources for very few years of observation. Moreover, the consistency of 
the average all inclusive water tariff calculation methods cannot be verified.
Table 5.1 Proportion of Urban Population Living in Slums
Year Argentina Indonesia Philippines Morocco Bolivia Ecuadc
1990 30.5 50.8 54.3 37.4 62.2 -
1995 31.7 42.6 50.8 35.2 58.2 -
2000 32.9 34.4 47.2 24.2 54.3 -
2005 26.2 26.3 43.7 13.1 50.4 21.5
2007 23.5 23.0 42.3 13.1 48.8 -
Source: UN Habitat (2008)
Note. Ecuador data only available for 2005.
5.3 Water Connections
Although attempts were made to acquire disaggregated residential household 
connections and consumption data, very few figures could be found. In the few  
cases where residential figures have been identified, it has simply been for specific 
years and does not necessarily permit comparative analysis. Consequently figures 
used in this partial analysis comprise domestic, commercial and institutional 
connections and consumption. Nonetheless, household and group tap connections 
typically make up a large proportion (i.e. over 70%) of all water connections.
Water connection figures for each city are adjusted to a baseline of 1 0 0  at 
year zero. From the adjusted connection figures, average annualized rates of change 
are calculated for the specific reform periods. This data and respective calculations 
are represented in Figures 5 .1  and 5.2 , respectively.
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Figure 5 .1  Water Connection Trends
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Source: Constructed from data provided by Alcazar et al. (2000), AySA (2005-2010) (Buenos Aires); 
JWSRB (2009, 2011), Bakker et al. (2006), Tutuko et al. (2001), Shofiani (2003) (Jakarta): MWSS 
Regulatory Office (2003), Altmann (2007) (Manila): Foster and Irusta (2003), Food and Water Watch 
(2006), Chia et al. (2007)(La Paz-EI Alto)
The connections figures are generally referred to as registered or official 
connections. They are implied as a proxy for household water access although it is 
not verified whether any of the presented figures comprise only household 
connections. Furthermore, geographic expansion of the respective water services is 
implied but disputed in specific cases. The disputes relate to documented evidence 
that in Buenos Aires, Jakarta and La Paz-EI Alto cases, by example, installed water 
connections within existing network areas are used to achieve increased water 
coverage targets.
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Figures 5 .1  and 5.2 simply account for the numbers and changes in reported 
water connections installed each year as a measure of raw performance without 
accounting for population changes. Viewing Figure 5.1, the confluence of data points 
at Year 0  (X Axis) and Connections 100  (Y Axis) represents the beginning of 
privatization for each of the four cases shown. It can be seen that all four cities are 
experiencing growth in the number of water network connections both before and 
after privatization. Buenos Aires shows a steady climb during the four years of public 
water provision preceding the 13 year period of water privatization, during which a 
slight additional increase in the trend is temporarily apparent (approximately years 2 
-  4  of privatization). The trend then shows a marked increase during the second 
phase of public water (years 1-4 shown in the right hand columns of the figure). 
Jakarta’s line prior to privatization is based on an average (specifically for years -10  
to -1). This increase accelerates during privatization (particularly years 3 - 5 )  then 
steadies again similar to the pre-privatization trend. Manila shows significant 
increase in the trend, particularly after year 6 of privatization although no data is 
available for the preceding public period. Finally, La Paz-EI Alto’s increasing trend 
steadily increases both before and after privatization, lowering slightly after year 5  of 
privatization.
Figure 5.2 shows the average annual rates of change of water connections for 
water network connections, calculated based on the same data presented in Figure 
5 .1 .50 The trends accentuate the previous observations noted above. Buenos Aires 
clearly experienced growth in connections early during privatization. This rate of
50 The figures at each respective year represent the average rate of change for the specific water 
provision model type to that date.
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increase then steadily declined. Buenos Aires’ second period of public water 
provision then brings a renewed increase for the few observed years. Jakarta 
experiences an initial increase in the rate of installation during privatization which 
then declines to a level similar to pre-privatization. La Paz-EI Alto shows a tapering of 
increases after privatization, which fall below pre-privatization levels. Manila clearly 
shows an initial increase followed by further surges, but without comparison to the 
pre-privatization period.
Figure 5 .2  Average Annual Connections Change per Water Model
Buenos Aires
Manila
La Paz /  El Alto
Source: Average annual connections changes are calculated based on data presented in Figure 5.1.
For the three cases showing years of public provision represented visually in 
Figures 5 .1  and 5.2, the average rate of annual change, adjusted to the year of
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privatization, is higher for the public model.51 Note that all four cities have reported 
disputable figures, relating to some of the water connections alleged as being 
installed within the existing networks rather than in expansion zones. Despite such 
issues, the results of annual increases in numbers of water connections slightly 
favour the pre-privatization era.
The importance of this finding is constrained as no comparable financial 
information on water supply cost per unit has been accessed as a metric for 
‘efficiency’. In light of such limitations, water connections installations before and 
after privatization are compared from the perspective that the private model’s 
contractual expectations are that it outperform the previous public model (as 
discussed in Chapter Four).52 These issues are discussed further in later sections of 
this chapter.
5 .4  Water Coverage
The water coverage trends for five cases53 prior to and after privatization are 
shown in Figure 5.3. A variety of sources are used, as indicated, either providing 
figures directly and/or from which coverage rates are calculated to establish trends. 
In Buenos Aires, water coverage trends follow a very similar line to the previously 
noted connections trend. The results between water model periods are very similar, 
and then climb significantly during the second period of public provision. Jakarta 
appears to be increasing coverage at a higher rate until about Year -5 before
51 Buenos Aires 3.53%  (1.67 using prior public period only) vs. 1.77, Jakarta 6.29 vs. 5 .91 , La Paz /  El 
Alto 6 .91  vs. 5.70.
52 Outside of the context of contractual expectations, it is difficult to generalize the reasonable level of 
expected annual rates of connections installations (e.g. In terms of the capacity to expand the water 
network during privatization).
53 Casablanca is excluded due to significant data discrepancies preventing the estimation of any 
reasonable trend.
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privatization and then steadily increases at a lower rate of change for the remaining 
years, with the exception of a slight increase just before and after privatization. 
Manila’s trend shows slightly declining water coverage before privatization which 
then steadily climbs thereafter. La Paz-EI Alto’s trend reflects alternating levels of 
coverage increases each year until a few years into privatization after which coverage 
declines. Guayaquil’s water coverage makes little change before privatization and 
then experiences decline. These declines (and declines in coverage in general) 
primarily relate to population rate increases exceeding water connection installation 
rates.
Figure 5.3 Water Coverage Comparison
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Source: Constructed from data provided by Marin (2009), AySa (2005-2010), Dardenne (2006) 
(Buenos Aires); JWSRB (2009), Schouten and Halim (2010), Bakker et al. (2006) (Jakarta); MWSS RO 
(2003, 2011), Negishi (2010), David (2000), Altmann (2007 ) (Manila); Morales et al (2006 ) (La Paz-EI 
Alto); Tiepolo (2007), Swyngedouw (1997) (Guayaquil)
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Figure 5 .3  reflects that Manila’s water privatization has been more successful 
in increasing coverage than during the years leading up to privatization, while public 
provision coverage rates have increased to a greater degree than during privatization 
for Buenos Aires, Jakarta, La Paz-EI Alto and Guayaquil.
Water Supply Cost
In absence of verifiable cost data from the companies on per unit cost of 
water supply, the few observations of coverage rates above provide only a partial 
view of how privatization has compared to the pubic model. It is important to 
acknowledge that network expansion is likely increasingly expensive in the peripheral 
network areas to be served in these cities. The potential of increased direct capital 
costs and related challenges are apparent and relevant. The direct elements of 
these challenges have theoretically been accounted for within the original contractual 
obligations though. Either way, through privatization, the companies have clearly 
inherited significant challenges in meeting their contracted deliverables.
Experimental Changes in Coverage Assumptions
Figures 5 .4  and 5 .5  provide a variation of the five cases’ figures presented 
above. The purpose is to reflect on whether changes in assumptions substantially 
alter the results. For Figure 5.4, Buenos Aires coverage rates are adjusted to accept 
Marin’s (2009 ) population served figures at the end of the privatization rather than 
the AySA (2005  -  2010) cited figures.54 This change in assumptions flattens the  
post-privatization section of the trend. Jakarta’s trend is adjusted to reflect higher 
Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB, 2 0 0 9 ) figures based on smaller
54 This change in assumptions provides for comparison but is not necessarily realistic given that a 
steady stream of capital investment was not occurring at the end of the privatization given the state of 
dispute for this concession during its last four years.
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household size estimates. Although JWSRB reports these figures as the data 
provided by the concessionaires, they question their validity given that household 
size information has not been updated to appropriately calculate resulting coverage 
rates.55 Additional figures are used prior to privatization, provided by Schouten and 
Halim (2010), to reasonably adjust this sample alternative trend. This could 
generally be described as an ‘unaudited’ version of coverage rates. Despite the 
issues with this version, it simply suggests an ‘alternative version’ of coverage rates 
to date for Jakarta that are climbing at a slightly higher rate than the initially 
established version. Manila’s trend in Figure 5 .4  is adjusted to align with Marin’s
(2009 ) suggestion that coverage started at 60% and increased to 80%. This version, 
particularly as representing the starting coverage for the privatization, contradicts 
official data estimates. Pre-privatization coverage is also adjusted to align with the 
implied difference in coverage relative the known numbers of connections and 
respective population prior to the concession. Manila’s trend consequently still looks 
very similar to Figure 5.3 in that coverage increased following privatization. La Paz-EI 
Alto’s coverage rate depiction in Figure 5 .4  simply suggests what the trend looks like 
if it could be assumed that the coverage rate stabilized after year 5 of privatization. 
Guayaquil’s revised trend relaxes the notion that population has been increasing at 
the rate implied by Tiepolo’s (2007) data. This results in a slowly increasing trend 
rather than declining as is shown in Figure 5.3.
55 The calculation for the original version of the coverage rate trend as included in Figure 5 .3  could be 
viewed as representing a household size of approximately 7 or at about 80% of the potential range 
implied by JWSRB (2009).
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Figure 5 .4  Water Coverage -  Alternate (2)
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Source: Constructed from data provided by Marin (2009), AySA (2005-2010), Dardenne (2006 )  
(Buenos Aires. Based on average annual changes from year 1.); JWSRB (2009), Schouten and Halim 
(2010), Bakker et al. (2006) (Jakarta); Marin (2009), MWSS RO (2003, 2011), Negishi (2010), David 
(2000), Altmann (2007) (Manila); Morales et al (2006), Food and Water Watch (2006), U.S. 
Department of State (2009) (La Paz-EI Alto. Supplemented by assumption that coverage rates stabilize 
after year 5 of privatization); Tiepolo (2007), Swyngedouw (1997) (Guayaquil. Supplemented with 
assumption of lower population trends.)
Considering Figure 5 .4 ’s alternate assumptions and source information, 
Jakarta and La Paz-EI Alto still reflect that public provision has higher increases in 
coverage rates than during privatization, while Buenos Aires and Guayaquil now show 
mixed results between models. Manila’s trend remains similar to the original version.
An additional alternate version (3) is represented by Figure 5 .5 . This version 
represents lower coverage rate estimates. Buenos Aires is adjusted based on the 
coverage rate being calculated from the metropolitan area population. Jakarta is
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adjusted by using a lower estimation of average household size as suggested by 
JWSRB. La Paz-EI Alto coverage rates are adjusted during privatization to account for 
coverage rate findings from Laurie and Crespo (2 0 0 7 ).56 Guayaquil’s pre­
privatization trend is significantly affected by alternative lower figures identified via 
Swyngedouw (1997).
Manila’s trend is based on the same figures presented in Figure 5 .3 , therefore 
still reflects privatization increasing coverage rates. Buenos Aires, La Paz-EI Alto and 
Guayaquil reflect higher public provision coverage trends. The additional alternate 
adjustments reflected in Figure 5 .5  make Jakarta’s results rather ambiguous having 
flattened the trend for all years.
56 Laurie and Crespo (2007) found that only just over 20% of water connections were for expansion 
while the rest were installed within the existing network (referred to as ‘densification’), hence not 
sufficiently expanding the network as was originally understood to be intended by the parties.
Figure 5 .5  Water Coverage Comparison -  Alternate (3)
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Sources: Constructed from data provided by Marin (2009), AySa (2005-2010), UN (2012 ) (Buenos 
Aires): Schouten and Halim (2010), Bakker et al. (2006), JWSRB (2009) (Jakarta); MWSS RO (2003), 
Negishi (2010), David (2000) (Manila); Morales et al (2006), Food and Water Watch (2006), U.S 
Department of State (2009); Chia et al. (2007), Laurie and Crespo (2007 ) (La Paz-EI Alto); Tiepolo 
(2007), Swyngedouw (1997) (Guayaquil)
Coverage Summary
Table 5 .2  summarizes figures from the preceding three Figures (5 .3  -  5 .5). 
The original version (5.3) weighted averages show that the public model has 
outperformed privatization at a ratio of about 4:3 (1.2% vs. 0.9%  average annual 
coverage changes). The first alternate version (2) results suggest very close results 
between the public and private model, 1.1% vs. 1.2% weighted average annual
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coverage increases, respectively.57 The additional alternate version (3) figures 
suggest that the public model coverage increases are more than 3:1 over the private 
model (1.1% vs. 0.3% annually on average). The original version data from Figure 5 .3  
comprises the most conservative estimates based on either official coverage data 
and/or have passed some level of audit or research scrutiny. In four of the five 
cases’ (all except Manila) public models have outperformed privatization based on 
water coverage.
Table 5 .2  Water Coverage Versions -  Average Annual Changes Per Model
WATER COVERAGE VERSIONS Average Annual Changes Per Model (%)
PUBLIC jYrs PRIVATE jYrs
City Original Ait (2) Alt (3) Observed Original Alt (2) Alt (3) [Observed
! / ■ I
Buenos Aires 179% r  s 0.8% A  13
1.1% i 8 1.3% f 13
1.1%: 8 0.2%i 13
Jakarta 2.1% 10 1.4% i 10
, 2.8% , '  - 1 10 1.8%' - . I 10
1.9%/ 10 1.2%j 10
Manila -0.3% i 7 1.9% ' ' ' ' I 9
-0.3% 7 2.0% 1 10
-0.3%! 7 1.9% I 9
La Paz /  El Alto 2.5% 8 l _  -0.5% I 5
2.5%" , / 8 -0.3% 1.............. 9
2.5%! 8 -1.9%’ 7
Guayaquil 0.0% ' : 11 -1.5% r  3
_ _  _____ r~ , -0.4% ' | 11 1.7% ! el
1 0.0% 11 -1.5%! 3
1
I . . . .  I
Weighted Avg Chg* 1.2% 1.2% ; 1.1%; 0.9% 1.3% 0.3%i
* Weighted average based on the number of years of observation per case. I !
As many of the cases have contradictory figures available, it is relevant to
have examined the degrees to which changes to the observed data points impact the 
above results. Alternate version (2) includes some questionable assumptions, 
although the alternate version (3) as shown in Figure 5 .5  and also reported in Table 
5.2 includes assumptions which either adjust population to higher estimates, adjust 
for household size discrepancies, and/or adjust for reported connections
57 Noting the previous issues raised as to the validity of this particular version of figures.
97
installations not all being an ‘expansion’ of the existing network58. This latter version 
of figures illustrates an even greater differential between the public model and 
privatization coverage changes on average (as per Table 5.2), although the overall 
results still show that the same four of five cases’ public models outperformed 
privatization based specifically on water coverage changes.
Connections and Coverage Data Limitations
Casablanca has been entirely left out of this analysis due to discrepancies 
between reported figures and the anecdotal evidence that an audit has occurred 
refuting connection installation and coverage figures cited by the company. La Paz-EI 
Alto's concession figures have included results of audit figures to better capture the 
actual results of water privatization during the concession term. The large 
discrepancies between company claims and audited figures beg the same questions 
of the performance.data for the other cities. In the case of Buenos Aires, the 
remunicipalization of the water services highlighted a discrepancy relating to the final 
figures at the end of privatization -  beginning of new public services. Despite there  
being active civil society groups in the other cities, no known third party audits or 
estimations have been made for Jakarta, Manila or Guayaquil.
5 .5  Water Consumption
Water consumption figures are identified for all of the case cities to varying 
degrees, whereby IBNET (2005 -2011 ) filled in gaps where other available sources 
were not identified. However, in all cases, the years of observation are limited, and 
specifically to years after privatization started. Different methods are used in the 
arriving at the scope and estimation methods across cases. Nonetheless, this brief
58 As adjusted for La P a z / El Alto for Alt.Version (3).
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analysis is conducted to help identify any particular trends or insights into 
privatization effects on consumer welfare as feasible. Residential consumption 
figures are not commonly identified. In many of the cases, household meters are still
not consistently installed to ensure the availability of disaggregated residential
l
figures. Total consumption is generally used as a proxy for residential consumption 
with the provision that any differences in results are examined closely.
i
Water consumption per capita trends are plotted over the privatization years 
for each of the cases in Figure 5 .6  (Year of Privatization = 0). Buenos Aires’ water 
consumption per capita shows as relatively constant over the few available years 
(years 7 -  10). It can be seen that Buenos Aires’ water volume consumed per capita 
is more than double that of the next nearest concession (Manila East). 'Jakarta’s 
consumption level begins to climb initially and then slowly decline after the first two 
years of privatization. From the beginning of the concession, the drop represents 
about a 11% decline (or about 19% from its peak). Manila West’s consumption also 
initially increases (by over 20%) then slowly declines after year 2 back to its original 
level. Casablanca’s water consumption level can be seen as dropping over 30%  
during privatization.59 La Paz-EI Alto’s consumption trend reflects a slight decline
I
over four of five of the observed years. The year 6 figure (Approx. 1 5 .3 3  cubic 
metres), however, may be a data error, particularly given that the level of daily
i
consumption implied is just over 40  litres per day per capita.60 Guayaquil’s brief 
three year trend shows a 10% decline initially and then a return near to its previous
59 Note that as no figure was specifically identified for Year 7 of privatization, this missing data point is 
reflected by a break in the trend line.
60 As the data represents aggregate consumption, the figures imply an even lower residential level of 
consumption. This would be particularly alarming given that the absolute minimum requirement for 
basic needs is considered to be 50  litres per day.
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i
level as of year 4  of privatization. Finally, Manila East shows an increase of over 50%  
consumption during the years of observation.
Figure 5 .6  Water Consumption61
Water Consumption Over Privatization
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Sources: Constructed from data provided by IBNET (2005  - 2 01 1 ) (Buenos Aires); JWSRB (2009) 
(Jakarta); MWSS RO (2003, 2011) (Manila); LYDEC, 2 00 6  (Casablanca); IBNET (20 05 -2011 ) (La Paz- 
EI Alto); IBNET (2005-2011) (Guayaquil)
Four concessions can clearly be seen as experiencing declining levels of 
consumption during privatization. One of these cases, Manila, also includes an 
increase - in the East Manila concession. Buenos Aires shows rather constant 
consumption over its few years of observation, and Guayaquil shows a slight decline 
over three years of observation.
61 Volumes converted to cubic metres per year where necessary. Note that 36.5 cubic metres per year 
is approximately equivalent to 100 litres capita per day. Also, note that commercial and institutional 
consumption is included in the figures.
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Additional Consumption Insights
The Manila West, La Paz-EI Alto, Casablanca and Jakarta (by year 9  of 
privatization) consumption levels, are extremely low in terms of per capita volume, as 
implied for domestic basic needs. In the case of Casablanca, water production and 
related constraints have been previously noted by the company (e.g. LYDEC, 2 0 0 6 )  
which may contribute to the declining low levels of consumption reached by year 8  of 
privatization. Alternative private well and indirect network vendor source supply also 
act to complicate understanding the degree to which the formal water network water 
consumption figures, for most of the cases, accurately represent domestic water 
consumption behaviour.
Consumption Caveat
Consumption per capita as represented by the figures in this brief analysis 
can only be estimated in most cases. The reasons are that the only information that 
can potentially be established as known from the start of privatization for most cases 
is the number of water connections. This is due to a lack of household metering in 
many cases. Even then, the varying inherited network conditions, circumstances and 
chosen strategies associated with water delivery method (i.e. individual household, 
shared household, public water connections, and transfer of responsibility at network 
connection points to third parties.) complicate understanding established figures and 
estimation methods as an accurate reflection of per capita consumption. Moreover, 
the data in Figure 5 .6  represents domestic, industrial, commercial and institutional 
consumption. Although, it has been generally noted that residential consumption 
represents a major portion of aggregate consumption, changes in the other modes of 
consumption may contribute to changes in the observed trends.
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5.6 Water Pricing
As water pricing for Manila has differed between the two concession areas 
and the concessions have been identified as having different situations and levels of 
success, these prices are shown separately. Water prices (tariffs) are adjusted for 
comparison using the general Consumer Price Indices (CPI’s) for each country (from 
United Nations, 200 6  and 2010). All nominal prices are divided by the respective 
year’s general CPI for each country. Water price data is then converted to a base of 
100 for the first observation, generally one year prior to the first data observation, 
beginning at year 0  of privatization or later as applicable. All of the nominal price 
data is based on quoted or average residential water pricing.
Water prices during privatization as available are shown in Figure 5 .7 . All 
cases begin at adjusted real prices of 100  in year 0 , except for Buenos Aires which 
begins in year 4  of privatization. Buenos Aires’ trend shows real water prices 
increasing by more than 30%  then dropping again to near original levels (due to 
hyperinflation). Jakarta’s trend shows relatively stable prices then an increase of 
more than 30% by year 7. Manila West’s real water prices initially drop, increase 
significantly, then double as of year 8  onwards. Manila East prices initially decline by 
almost 60%, then slowly rise surpassing initial levels by year 6  and increasing to 
more than 50% original levels by year 11. Casablanca’s real price rates are relatively 
stable, declining slightly over the observed period (due to inflation rates slightly 
exceeding the reported nominal water price increases). La Paz-EI Alto real prices 
slowly drop by almost 30% over nine years. Finally, Guayaquil’s prices increase 
dramatically and taper off at an almost 100%  increase over the brief five years of 
observation. As observed, three cases (four companies) have resulted in significant
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real water price increases (Jakarta, Manila West and East, and Guayaquil). Buenos 
Aires fluctuates significantly but returns to similar levels as year 4. It is unknown how 
this relates to levels at the beginning of the concession, although it is suspected that 
earlier levels would have been lower given initial nominal price increases and lower 
preceding inflation levels. Casablanca is the most stable in terms of real prices, and 
La Paz-EI Alto is the only case experiencing significant real price decline.
Figure 5 .7  Water Pricing Comparison
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Source: Constructed from data provided by Post (2009), Simpson (2006 ) (Buenos Aires); Bakker et al. 
(2006), Santono (2005), JWSRB (2011) (Jakarta); MWSS Regulatory Office (2011) (Manila); Olivier 
(2009) (Casablanca); Morales et al. (2006) (La Paz-EI Alto); Carrillo et al. (2006) (Guayaquil)
Note. All figures adjusted using CPI (UN 2006 , 2 01 0 ) and to base of 100.
5.7 Water Consumption and Pricing
Examining the combined results of the previous tables, it can be seen that
consumption during privatization has remained steady or declined as real prices have
risen in Buenos Aires, Jakarta, Manila West, and Guayaquil. In Casablanca and La
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Paz-EI Alto though, consumption has declined while real prices have also dropped. 
Manila East experienced a large initial reduction in real prices which may contribute 
to consumption increases discussed earlier. Generally speaking though, it can be 
seen that Manila East is the only example of consumption per capita rising during 
privatization. It cannot be said whether real price is influencing consumption or vice 
versa. This partly relates to a lack of supply cost information as mentioned earlier. 
Elasticity of Demand Comments
A few specific considerations should be mentioned in attempting to 
understand the effects that price increases may have had on consumption in these 
cases. The quantitative data analyzed above has various limitations. First of all, 
consumption has not been isolated to domestic consumption. As a result, it cannot 
be known the exact proportion comprising domestic consumption for each case. As 
noted in Chapter One, basic needs consumption has been articulated as equivalent 
to 50  litres of water per capita per day. It is possible in several of these cases that 
the domestic proportion of consumption has remained or is nearing levels where 
demand is highly inelastic for a proportion of the population. A further point here 
though is that average price and consumption figures were used in the analyses in 
this chapter. As many categories of customers are being aggregated in these 
average figures, it is difficult to truly understand the price elasticity of demand62. 
Secondly, as alluded to earlier, little can be said about water demand specifically 
given the lack of comparable information on water supply costs. Finally, as 
mentioned in the Consumption Caveat section earlier, comparable data which sheds
62 Price elasticity of demand can be generally described as the responsiveness of quantity demanded 
to changes in price.
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light on consumption behaviour relating to alternative sources is not understood and 
outside the scope of direct analysis here.
Water Conservation and Efficiency Comments
It can be theoretically argued that higher prices promote water conservation. 
Although no direct information has been found to support this objective in these 
cases, it can be seen that nominal prices (as discussed in earlier chapters) as well as 
real prices (as analyzed in this chapter) have generally risen during privatization. At 
least, we can say that prices rose unanimously for Buenos Aires, Jakarta, Manila and 
Guayaquil. As was found by Argo and Laquian (2007), as discussed in Chapter 
Three, middle and upper classes were most affected by resulting price increases in 
Manila. This could easily be implied as a conservation incentive.
Theoretically any efficiency improvements achieved by privatization would be 
reflected in either water connections or coverage performance outcomes or lower 
prices. Water connection and coverage outcomes have been discussed. However, in 
the case of pricing, higher prices may be desirable to give incentive for conservation. 
In light of the foregoing considerations that complicate understanding demand 
elasticity, a further point in the context of efficiency and this quantitative analysis 
specifically is that the reasons for the resulting nominal prices changes are not well 
understood.
5 .8  Partial Quantitative Analysis - Summary
This section has included a partial quantitative analysis to shed light on water 
privatization’s success relative the preceding public model, and to examine any 
potential consumer impacts as potentially identified. Review of water connections 
data for four available cases, Buenos Aires, Jakarta, Manila, and La Paz-EI Alto,
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before and after privatization, suggests that privatization has not generally 
outperformed the public model. Water coverage analysis for five available cases, all 
except Casablanca, reflects that public water distribution primarily preceding water 
privatization has marginally outperformed the private model overall.
Manila’s water privatization is the exception, showing improvements over the 
public model which was showing as remaining constant in years preceding 
privatization. However, as it was identified in previous chapters that Manila Water 
(East Manila) has used informal water access to reflect improvements in its 
coverage; and as it is implied that the previous public coverage figures only 
represented formal network coverage, these qualitative findings contradict and raise 
questions as to the validity of Manila’s quantitative coverage results.
In five of six cases (Manila having been analyzed as two parts of one case) 
water consumption per capita has declined or remained constant over privatization. 
Only Manila’s East concession has shown consumption increases during 
privatization. Price analysis has shown that four of the six cases have experienced 
real price increases during observed periods. These prices may relate to 
corresponding consumption changes although various considerations limit 
understanding the direct relationship between water pricing and consumption for 
these cases. Further analysis of how prices have impacted consumer behaviour for 
the population served by water networks during privatization would require additional 
review of the underlying nominal prices and how inflation impacts respective 
consumer goods and services baskets. Furthermore, the brief review of prices is 
limited in that water prices have been directly tied to foreign currencies (US$ or Euro)
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in some cases potentially acting to further increase or contradict real prices as 
quoted.63
Generally speaking, the connections and coverage analyses have provided 
more information on privatization’s outcomes relative the public model given that 
they shed some light on both the served and un-served populations. Consequently, 
Buenos Aires, Jakarta, La Paz-EI Alto and Guayaquil water privatizations have not 
been found to outperform public models. Although Manila’s trend reflects an 
outperforming private model, the validity of these findings is questionable. Finally, no 
data was available to provide insight into Casablanca’s water coverage trend.
63 For example, Laurie and Crespo (2007) suggest a 35%  real price increase for La P a z / El Alto 
contrary to figures analyzed in this chapter provided via Morales et al (2006).
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
6 .1  Summary of Results
This thesis’ primary objective has been to answer the question of whether 
urban water privatization has worked in the Global South. Six key prominent cases of 
water privatization have been identified and examined using a mixed methodology, 
primarily focused on qualitative analysis, supplemented by a partial quantitative 
analysis. The results show that water privatization has generally failed to exceed the 
levels of water access that were achieved by the public models before it. As the prior 
public model is less analyzed and publicized than the private model though, water 
concession agreement performance has acted as a proxy for privatization’s success. 
In this respect, the privatization is generally considered to have not worked to date. 
The partial exception to this finding is that Casablanca’s case shows some promise 
based on a ten year review and subsequent renegotiation.
The supplemental quantitative findings reflect similar results between water
coverage and connection installations before and during privatization. However, they
also suggest that the initial pace of improvements begun to decline after the early
years of privatization. Manila’s available coverage information acts as an exception
suggesting that reported water coverage has far surpassed stagnant results reflected
in connections and coverage data figures prior to privatization. These results are
refutable though given West Manila’s recorded failure (during which water services
were temporarily transitions to public control again) and East Manila taking credit for
coverage increases resulting from bulk water sales64. Given that informal vendor
water resellers are not regulated by the water concessions, it seems counterintuitive
64 From Chapter Two, as highlighted by Kumar, 2009 , citing interviews with the Asian Development 
Bank. Also, Bakker et al., 2008, made suggestions that informal water supply should be regulated.
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that such results can be considered appropriate contractual performance inclusions. 
Also, Manila, as with Jakarta and Buenos Aires, appear to have signed water 
concession contracts that were not sustainable or that they intended to renege on. 
Overall, it appears that water privatization contracts have failed based on companies 
not being held accountable for performance and corresponding investment targets 
due to either ill-defined or ambiguous terms, or that terms were later altered. These 
failures relate to ineffective governance frameworks, with either poorly administered 
or non-existent legislative policy, which either did not or could not avoid corruption or 
collusion. Companies had the opportunity to verify the accuracy of information and 
various conditions relating to the case cities upon expressing interest in the 
privatization bids or the direct contracts. In either event, four of the case cities have 
involved significant contract renegotiations. Buenos Aires and Jakarta renegotiations 
appear to have only benefited the companies. Manila’s revisions allowed for limits in 
rate of return at the expense of previously mandated performance targets. 
Casablanca’s renegotiation is the only one of four which included elements to 
improve the company’s accountability. In another case, Guayaquil’s privatization was 
implemented without mandating clear performance targets in the concession 
agreement. Nonetheless, the company’s selling of ownership in the concession 
following a fine in 2 0 0 6  should be viewed as an accountability failure. It is not known 
whether the current company owners have improved water access significantly or 
taken on past liabilities for the original company’s shortcomings.
Water privatization has failed in all cases to varying degrees, reflected in 
disputable water access improvements which have not clearly been intended to 
expand geographic access to water. These situations have included contradictory
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interpretations of water access calculations and the use of various cost-saving 
methods which have included informal water distribution channels in four of the 
cases (Jakarta, Manila, Casablanca65, and Guayaquil). La Paz-EI Alto’s contract was 
terminated partly due to the company’s underperformance, effectively 
misinterpreting network expansion terms. Buenos Aires’ concession was eventually 
terminated due to the stand-off between network expansion and the need for higher 
prices to make the company profitable in the face of hyperinflation. Capital 
investments have underperformed and been spent in predominantly foreign 
currencies in four of the cases (all except La Paz-EI Alto and Guayaquil for which such 
terms are unknown), leading to inordinate levels of foreign technical consultancy 
fees. In each of these cases, there is question as to whether the reported foreign 
expenditures validly added to the respective capital infrastructure stocks.
Consequently, the water privatizations have generally failed to meet originally 
negotiated contractual performance and investment targets, as based on the 
available evidence to date. There is secrecy in many cases surrounding the water 
privatization models, their implementations, and operations. The governments, 
legislation, political cultures, IFI, regional development banks, and bilateral parties, 
companies and negotiated contracts are all influential parties and factors to varying 
degrees at particular stages in such secrecy. All cases reflect a general lack of open 
communications and diplomacy that includes the lack of an open dialogue with the 
general public - to have ensured that privatization results not only appear to meet 
originally intended objectives, but are achieving them.
65 As previously noted, there has been reference to subcontracting in Casablanca although the details 
of these arrangements are unknown.
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The four active privatized water models still involve public protests and a 
pressured progression towards accountability reflected in recent fines. Jakarta, 
Manila and Guayaquil still appear to formally lack accountability to maintain a 
trajectory of network improvements and expansion though. This is reflected in the 
allowance of unregulated informal vendor water provisions, which appear to be 
included in reported coverage rates for Manila, as discussed above, as well as 
Jakarta. Guayaquil has little or no accountability for network expansion. Casablanca 
appears as the only potential exception given recent renegotiations with positive 
elements for network provision. The future will tell as to whether these parties will 
continue to mask, repair or terminate their respective urban water models.
6 .2  Water Governance Lessons
Various lessons from the implementation of water privatization in the six 
studied cases have become apparent. This section summarizes some of the critical 
issues observed and provides recommendations for alleviating such issues.
Clear and Measurable Performance Targets
First and foremost, contractual agreements between governments and private 
sector parties require close inspection and an attention to detail that will not allow for 
varying interpretations and complex disputes down the road. As various levels of 
government and the general public are all stakeholders in water services, it is 
essential that these parties all have representation that facilitates the opportunity to 
review and provide input to the contract before negotiation with the service contract 
party.
I l l
The resulting contract must have clear, measurable and intentional 
performance targets with very clear, enforceable, sufficient and monitored sanctions 
for non-compliance. The contract must specify the requirement of access to 
documents by all respective levels of government, regulator and independent auditor. 
Controlling Investment Terms
Foreign equity and debt issues, investment expenditures and distributions 
appear to mitigate performance when not regulated from the outset in the contract.
It is necessary to openly define cost of capital, capital infrastructure sourcing, 
currency of trade, technical consultant fee percentages, as well as dividend 
distribution timing and percentages. These contractual terms need to be explicitly 
set during negotiations with clearly aligned penalties for non-compliance.
Countries in the Global South in particular should be focused on raising 
capital in local markets where feasible. Although examples of this have now become 
apparent in some of the case cities (Jakarta, Manila and Casablanca), it is still 
important to consider such capital raising issues in the context of cost of capital to 
prioritize necessary capital works accordingly. There is an increasing admission that 
the private sector is not necessarily capable of financing sufficient capital for such 
arrangements. Any notion of a best practice contract would have determined this 
fact up front and potentially avoided such a costly reform to water governance.
Exchange rate risks must be mitigated by the state. Consequently, such risks 
should not be borne solely by the state and public. Clearly, this is a negotiating item, 
however it would appear in several of the six cases that the government was to bear 
the risks of exchange rate fluctuations. Such a circumstance cannot possibly be
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favourable to a publicly-provided water model financially dependent on domestic 
currency.
Water Pricing Regulation
It is critical that terms of price regulation are specified clearly in the water 
contract to inform and gain public acceptance and avoid future conflicts. Moreover, 
an appropriate water pricing regime with a progressive increase per water volume is 
necessary, as a matter of recognizing the incremental costs of water and 
encouraging conservation. Such a pricing model should not penalize the poor, 
charging average rates per volume greater than the same rates for high volume 
users. Any resulting model implies that higher volume consumption subsidizes lower 
volume users. It cannot be denied that without such provisions, additional societal 
costs would be and are necessary for public safety, public health and existing 
apparent urban infrastructure planning.
Water Monopoly Model
A water monopoly may be the most practical way of transferring services to 
the private sector, but the evidence shows that it has not worked better than the 
public model, acknowledging Casablanca’s potential future success stemming from 
its renegotiation and East Manila’s debatable coverage methods. The inordinate 
level of power of the multinational companies demonstrated in (three of the four) 
renegotiations, disputes, and a general lack of accountability by all parties, suggests 
that a better model must exist. Such a model may be the public model. It is clear 
though that an incentive for effective and sufficient investments is critical. This point 
is the source of water privatization’s failures and has also contributed to the 
terminations.
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It is not clearly evident that the private sector has demonstrated superior 
technical capacity as reflected in the six cases to date. Moreover, local factors such 
as historically inherited city infrastructure, deficiencies, water supply and quality 
issues, and other elements of the urban environment, flooding and other climate 
related issues ail should have been incorporated into the appropriate water model to  
suit the local conditions. This does not appear to be the case. Instead a one-size- 
fits-all model was essentially implemented in all of the cities.66 Water privatization, 
as implemented in the studied cases has various implications for effective 
governance.
Corporate Due Diligence
The companies had the obligation of directly researching (1) Infrastructure 
conditions, (2) Physical parameters within and outside of the planning area, and (3) 
Relevant urban planning data in the service expansion zones, as applicable. If 
imposed timelines were too rigid, the bidders would have scoffed. It is not apparent 
that such issues arose publicly. Instead, private negotiations, involvement from  
bidder host countries, and a general lack of competition for the contracts was the  
case. Such a lack of due diligence implies collusion or a backroom trust in the World 
Bank-led process, perhaps expecting future renegotiations once needed.
Water Governance
Weak governance models and a lack of appropriate corresponding exercisable 
policy have left governments in increasingly compromised positions during water 
privatization. This has engendered backroom deals and nasty legal disputes.
66 Little is known about Casablanca’s water contract. It is similar to the others although the World 
Bank did not necessarily play a key facilitating role.
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Notwithstanding other elements of best practice recommended in this chapter, 
addressing such issues of governance and policy up front can reduce subsequent 
disputes and make the water model more effective. It is not clear though that the 
negotiating national government actors did not intend to essentially transfer 
accountability for water provision to the new private actors. Transferring water 
responsibilities has allowed the fiscal reasons for water price increases to bypass 
public debate making the multinational companies the centre of attention.
In several of the water cases, there have been corresponding accusations and 
legal cases of corruption. Implementing measures of public consultation in the water 
concession contracts acts to establish or restore public confidence, and also makes 
the company more responsive to customer needs. The governance framework 
should include an auditor and regulatory model which are transparent and 
responsive to public concerns. These elements need to be addressed in legislation, 
operating policy, and specified clearly in water contracts and revisions of contracts. 
Communication requirements should also be addressed in policy accordingly. The 
governance structure, its components and exercisable policy are necessary to reduce 
corruption and increase transparency and accountability.
Public Consultation
Clearly, public consultation and participation are often seen as arduous and 
slow down processes, as reflected in these cases. However, meaningful input from 
the general public, including significant interest groups such as the vast urban poor, 
must provide solutions that are more sustainable than those made with little or no 
public input. Avoiding protest requires involving the people, however divided they 
may be. The water models, as discussed, did not account for any input from the
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general public. They were preconceived and implemented without any significant 
structural changes. These scenarios essentially guarantee one of two future 
directions: (1) the public protests until a new model is implemented, or (2) the public 
is ignored and controlled to a degree that does not fully handicap the current water 
models. Of course, improvements are possible under the current models, however, 
with no clear framework for accountability ensures that parties will continue to act for 
their own self interests.
The Water Privatization Myth
Private sector participation in the water sector cannot resolve all water supply 
issues for urban cities in the Global South. The efficiency argument is misplaced as 
water provision is a complex service delivering an essential resource within the  
context of various urban services in rapidly changing urban settings. Furthermore, 
‘privatization’ as a definition may be misleading given the extent to which states 
involve themselves in advocating for, investing in and ensuringthe success of 
companies. For example, French water companies have been noted as depending on 
the French government as a major shareholder, implying a blurring of lines between 
privatized and public water provision (See, for example, Hall and Lobina, 2 0 0 9 ). This 
is particularly relevant given the immense presence of Suez S.A. (in five of the six 
privatization cases).
International Influence and the Lack of Autonomy
The circumstances in at least five of the six study cases have involved 
international pressures to decentralize the urban water sector (implying a decrease 
in transfers to support services) and provide options for financing operations and 
necessary water network expansions. Being policy handcuffed by the World Bank
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and IMF ensured that the model would be self-financed (or continuously push in that 
direction) which assured that network expansion would underperform initial 
promises, particularly given the extent of the urban poor in these cities.
A history of loans and related conditions have ensured that water privatization 
would be carried out based on a homogenous model which limits state autonomy to 
positively influence policy or the services without fully deregulating prices. Even then, 
there is little evidence that water access would look much different than today’s 
results. Allowing companies to increase prices without any regulation would simply 
allow existing consumers to be charged excessively. This may result in reduced 
consumption in the case cities, implying elastic consumption, although realistically 
those that cannot afford increased prices will likely seek alternative modes of water 
access. As indicated earlier though, little can be said of the elasticity of demand on 
average based on the partial quantitative analysis.
The World Bank and IMF are part of an international umbrella which is 
presumably accountable to nation states albeit inequitably. The collective nation 
states under the UN umbrella would need to agree on changes to the World Bank’s 
role (and WTO and IMF). Is this possible? Who would police them? International 
governance requires the collective nations to ensure accountability. As structured 
today, the ICSID, MIGA, and the direct investment which the World Bank has engaged 
in in these cases, all amount to various conflicts of interest without any accountable 
recourse. There is no mechanism for state protection against the companies.
It appears that the nations involved in each of the six cases are not in a position to 
negotiate or dictate any terms with the World Bank. If this was the case, appointing 
an independent mutually agreed arbitrator with international transparency would be
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a potential starting point. A large step further would relate to re-evaluating the  
concept of a water monopoly for one city.
Along with regional development banks and various bilateral actors, the World 
Bank and IMF have pushed for international private sector firms to engage in water 
privatization activities in the six cases. Regulatory reforms have been directed 
towards decentralization and to minimize oversight as to not inhibit the private 
sector’s ability to function profitably. Direct consequences of related actions have 
involved capital flight, underinvestment, and the general lack of accountability 
already mentioned. Companies have not generally been held accountable as 
contracts were renegotiated in three of the cases. In turn, governments have not 
been accountable to their populations by agreeing to the overarching concession 
models. The IFI’s are not accountable agents in any substantive way. This is 
reflected in the ICSID set up, and more so in the contradiction between a said 
commitment to alleviate poverty while engaging in facilitation of agreements that do 
not appear to be beneficial to the affected populations.
Only two methods of regaining autonomy are apparent for affected states: (1) 
Reduce debts to effectively terminate structural adjustment agreements, or (2) 
Examine and potentially challenge the legality of respective loans.
Water for the Poor
The prevalence of the poor in the six study cases suggests that a model such 
as water privatization based on water monopolies is an overly simplistic approach to 
a very complex set of issues relating to urban water access. The goal of extending 
water to the general public let alone poor households is a monumental task in each 
instance. Innovative solutions are needed that allow for the poor to access
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alternative sources of water and enable subsidization that is not driven by a water 
monopoly provider. The best solutions for provision of water for the poor will need to  
circumvent the standard policy and be driven by the local community and specifically 
involved interest groups.
Urban Development
Clearly, these cases demonstrate the complex economic, political, social and 
technical challenges of providing potable water to an increasingly sprawling urban 
landscape. Urban planning and development must theoretically be integrated with 
the water model to ensure that efficiencies are gained in the trajectory of developing 
the urbanized region. This also helps with social accountability. The six cases all 
reflect undeveloped areas of the city whether central or peripheral; and often people 
settle in precarious settings as noted of Guayaquil’s hillside or under bridges in 
Jakarta. The continued forces of urbanization require that water networks are 
developed as part of larger urban plans.
Generally speaking, the removal of cross-subsidies acts to compartmentalize 
services. If privatization can work, it would require very explicit contractual terms and 
operational processes necessary for the collaboration between the company and 
various public departments to ensure, for example, that urban planning and 
development functions are positively affected. The majority of evidenced historical 
examples of successful economic and social (i.e. community or urban) development 
involve significant government leadership. The direction of the examined water 
models though is represented by government control without the necessary 
leadership. The water privatizations in all six cases have involved national 
government oversight with varying levels of regional and local level implementation.
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These levels of government involve varying elected and appointed offices with 
competing objectives which further complicate water privatization’s role in urban 
planning.
Democratic Rule
No one would openly dispute that democracy is a necessary elem ent of an 
open economy and a healthy private sector. Consequently, more power needs to be 
observed in the voices of the masses. This is not apparent in any of the six water 
privatization cases to any substantive degree. Public protests contributed to the  
termination of two of the concession agreements. As noted above, a public 
participation component is needed to sustain an effective model, whether or not 
water governance is privatized. Interestingly, a lack of transparency in urban water 
reforms and privatization complicate national and urban accountability as reflected in 
democratic processes.
6.3 Limitations of the Study
This study has encountered various limitations stemming from information not 
being readily available within the public domain or through requests. Although the  
existing academic literature researching the individually covered cases is growing, it 
is still difficult to access critical documents such as the privatization contracts. 
Moreover, temporal datasets could not be directly accessed for water connections, 
coverage, consumption, and pricing data before and after water privatization for each 
of the cases. Consequently, information was accessed through existing academic 
literature, regulatory reports and the companies to conduct the partial quantitative 
analysis. However, many contradictions exist between sources of information, 
requiring extended scrutiny. For example, official data in several cases has been
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unaudited data which cannot be trusted. Furthermore, a lack of information on water 
supply costs prevents extending analysis and commenting further on the elasticity of 
demand, for example.
An additional issue relates to the information available on urban populations, 
particularly slums and growing peri-urban populations. Some of the cases, such as 
La Paz-EI Alto and Buenos Aires, have noted issues of the formal concession areas 
not comprising the full urban metropolitan area. These cases, as well as Guayaquil, 
are noted as having a peri-urban sprawl which is difficult to understand in the context 
of understanding, defining and calculating water coverage. A lack of contractual 
clarity and audited data also made it difficult to identify where water connections 
were being installed in existing rather than new concession areas.
6.4 Further Research
Further research on water privatization can take a few related directions. The 
circumstances giving rise to and controlling the water privatization model 
implemented in at least five of the six studied cases include dominant international 
influence and controls. It is not only important to understand these controls, but also 
the pathways associated with transitioning the current models to either: (1) make 
privatization work or (2) re-municipalize the water model. This is relevant in 
understanding factors associated with state autonomy over water.
Another related area of study includes a focus on the financial constraints 
that brought about the implemented water privatization models. A better 
understanding of these forces is critical, but also studies focused on pathways to 
fiscal austerity while maintaining ambitious urban water provision goals. 
Understanding international accountability as housed in agreements, circumstances
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and expectations between nation states, the World Bank, and other international 
actors specifically relating to urban water privatization is essential in knowing 
whether there are alternative pathways to resolve failures stemming from water 
privatization.
Many or perhaps all of the studied cases involve governments that are 
affected by their historically implemented structures and events. Studying methods 
of reducing corruption as a lead up step to implementing water resource reforms 
affecting urban cities would be a valuable area of study.
Yet another potential area of study involves effective water governance as 
relating to urban planning and development in the context of water privatization. 
Water privatization, as implemented, is not effectively integrated with urban planning 
and development functions. The question is how to de-compartmentalize or rather 
ensure collaboration between historically public functions and the private sector to 
provide an effective and efficient suite of essential services.
An additional element of quantitative analysis, extending from this thesis 
would be to identify and analyze the cost of potable water supply and distinctions 
between potable and lower quality sources of water, in assessing and identifying best 
practice solutions to urban water provision in the Global South.
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